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 ABSTRACT 
Within the context of fiscal devolution or decentralization in the United States, 
states and localities are fulfilling redistributive functions previously under the 
responsibility of the federal government.  Under fiscal federalism, the federal 
government generally implements redistributive policies while local government 
focuses on development.  The theory of fiscal federalism argues that the potential for 
redistribution may be lower at the state and local levels than at the federal level due to 
developmental pressures.  As a result, movement toward devolution could decrease 
redistributive activities and raise the potential for spatial inequality across the nation. 
This study pays particular attention to the role of state policy under 
decentralization as more responsibility for redistribution and development is delegated 
away from federal government and down to state government.  States are emerging as 
a critical component of the multilevel federalist governmental system by playing both 
redistributive and developmental roles.  The states use two key policy tools to deal 
with the impacts of devolution: state aid and state centralization.  The analysis 
explores the extent to which state aid is redistributive or developmental in its focus, 
after controlling for state centralization. 
In order to conduct a complete study of decentralization at the micro, meso, 
and macro government levels, the federal and local government are also examined in 
addition to the state.  The study analyzes government finance during 1987-2002 for all 
U.S. counties in the lower forty-eight states to answer the following research question: 
Are federal aid, state aid, and local government revenue effort redistributive, 
developmental, or both?  In particular, the focus is on the changing roles and impacts 
of federal and state intergovernmental aid and state centralization of fiscal 
responsibility on local government revenue effort.  By looking over the 1987-2002 
time period, these evolving roles are tracked at three different governance scales: 
  
federal, state, and local.  The contribution of the work is to provide a global picture of 
governmental finance over a fifteen year period rather than focusing on specific 
programs.  Using data collected from the U.S. Census of Population, U.S. Census of 
Governments, and U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service, three fixed-effect cross-
sectional models are implemented for 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002.  In addition, three 
fixed-effect generalized estimation models are employed for the entire timeframe. 
The results show that both state aid and state centralization have steadily 
increased throughout the period studied, demonstrating the trend of recentralization 
within decentralization.  The study illustrates the emergence of the meso level state 
and its important roles for both redistribution and development.  State centralization is 
a substitute for state aid and local effort.  State aid is shown to be more redistributive 
in its focus, while federal aid and local effort are pro-cyclical and developmental. 
The findings indicate that the classical theory of fiscal federalism is less 
applicable to a more decentralized governmental system since federal aid, state aid, 
and local effort are all found to fulfill functions of both redistribution and 
development.  Instead of a simple dichotomy between redistributive vs. developmental 
policy objectives, there is a nuanced combination of both types of funding that reflects 
government support for growth poles as well as some interest in redistribution.  The 
results suggest that these two policy aims, which may seem contradictory, can work 
together, not in opposition.  Due to the economic and demographic disadvantages 
faced by rural areas, the analysis also takes on a spatial component by focusing on the 
spatial impacts of devolution in rural and urban counties.  Federal and state aid do not 
specifically target rural or urban counties.  However, redistributive federal and state 
aid is directed toward economic and demographic characteristics of rural counties.  On 
the other hand, developmental federal and state aid is aimed at economic and 
demographic characteristics of urban counties.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Objective 
The objective of this study is to analyze fiscal decentralization in the United 
States at the micro, meso, and macro government levels during 1987-2002.  More 
specifically, the focus is on the changing roles and impacts of federal and state 
intergovernmental aid and state centralization of fiscal responsibility on local 
government revenue effort.  By looking over the 1987-2002 time period, the analysis 
aims to track these evolving roles at three different governance scales: federal, state, 
and local.  The research documents the emergence of the meso level state and its 
important roles for both redistribution and development under devolution. 
As the United States faces its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression 
in the 1930s, policymakers are confronting important choices regarding the future of 
government finance at all levels.  In an environment of constrained fiscal resources, 
how can governments effectively pursue both redistribution and development?  How 
must the funding priorities of the federal, state, and local government change in order 
to adapt to this new economic era?  This analysis contributes valuable insights to these 
questions by tracking the redistributive and developmental impacts of federal aid, state 
aid, and local effort over 1987-2002. 
Research Question 
Within the context of fiscal devolution in the United States, states and 
localities are fulfilling redistributive functions previously under the responsibility of 
the federal government.  Under fiscal federalism, the federal government generally 
implements redistributive policies while local government focuses on development.  
The theory of fiscal federalism argues that the potential for redistribution may be 
lower at the state and local levels than at the federal level due to developmental 
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pressures.  As a result, movement toward devolution could decrease redistributive 
activities and raise the potential for spatial inequality across the nation.  The study will 
answer the following research question: Are federal aid, state aid, and local 
government revenue effort redistributive, developmental, or both? 
Design and Methods 
State- and county-level finance data were collected from the U.S. Census of 
Governments Finance Files for 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002.  Demographic data were 
retrieved from the U.S. Census of Population and Housing for 1980, 1990, and 2000.  
To answer the research question of whether federal aid, state aid, and local effort are 
redistributive or developmental, this study utilizes a fixed effect cross-sectional and 
generalized estimation modeling approach.  Three fixed-effect cross-sectional 
regression models are run for 1987, 1992, 1997, and 1992.  Next, three fixed effect 
generalized estimation models (GEM) are run including the data for all four model 
years in addition to significant interactions with a year variable to track trends over 
time. 
Outline 
Chapter 2 reviews the rural sociology literature pertaining to fiscal devolution 
and outlines the research question.  Chapter 3 describes the methodology implemented 
to conduct the study including data sources, unit of analysis, regression modeling 
techniques, variables, and descriptive statistics.  Chapter 4 provides an analysis and 
discussion of the regression results, in addition to the wider theoretical and policy 
implications of the study.  Chapter 5 is the conclusion and offers policy 
recommendations, challenges for future policy, and questions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Outline 
This chapter reviews the literature building the foundation for this study of 
fiscal devolution impacts on county government.  First, the U.S. federalist 
governmental system and its division of responsibilities for redistribution and 
development functions are explained.  Next, the historical patterns of centralization 
and decentralization of the U.S. government are discussed.  Then, the rural sociology 
literature outlining the advantages and disadvantages of devolution is reviewed.  
Finally, the research question that this analysis sets out to answer is stated. 
Federalism 
Federalism is a governmental system in which powers are divided between 
higher and lower levels of government such that both levels have separate and 
autonomous responsibility for social and economic welfare (Peterson 1981).  The 
theory of fiscal federalism lays out a general normative framework for responsibilities 
at different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying 
out these functions (Oates 1999).  Fiscal federalism sets forth an active and positive 
role for the central government in terms of correcting various forms of market failure, 
providing efficient output levels of national public goods, stabilizing the macro-
economy at high levels of employment with stable prices, and establishing an 
equitable distribution of income by providing assistance to the poor (Oates 2005).  The 
national level of government is in the position to pursue both redistributive and 
macroeconomic stabilization policies, with its broad and inclusive geographic scope.  
Localities face special difficulties in dealing with economic and social conditions that 
sprawl across jurisdictional boundaries (Pelissero and Morgan 1992).  The federal 
government also has capacity for the collection and redistribution of progressive 
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income taxes, whereas state and local tax systems are typically more regressive (Oates 
1999; Warner and Pratt 2005). 
Under fiscal federalism, local government plays a critical role in maintaining 
quality of life by providing important services (education and public safety) and 
infrastructure (roads, sanitation, and water supply).  The quality of such services and 
infrastructure depends on the economic capacity to generate revenues needed to 
accommodate spending demands (Johnson et al. 1995).  Government poverty indicates 
a lack of local government spending on public services due to the shortage of financial 
resources.  Where this condition occurs, government services are inadequate, 
adversely affecting the economy and standard of living (Reeder and Jansen 1995).  To 
the extent that local public sector investments are deemed important to create a level 
playing field of basic services and infrastructure to promote economic development, 
rising inequality is an expected result of both market forces and widely divergent local 
government investment capacity (Warner and Pratt 2005). 
Local government financial capacity is largely determined by two sources: the 
local labor market and government transfer payments.  Larger macroeconomic forces 
determine the structure of local labor market opportunity, while demographic features 
determine the level of transfer income.  As a result, local governments can do little to 
increase their economic capacity (Warner 1999).  Fiscal disparities exist when local 
governments must levy different tax rates to provide the same level of public services.  
These disparities reflect differences in both the ability of local governments to raise 
revenues and in the costs of providing local public services.  Cost disparities arise 
because economic, social, and demographic factors beyond the control of local 
governments make it more expensive to provide any given level of public services in 
some areas than in others (Bradbury et al. 1984). 
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Subject to balanced-budget constraints, state and local governments find that 
when their revenues decline during a recession, they must respond by cutting 
expenditures for a wide range of public services.  In such a context, a role for the 
central government to provide fiscal assistance to states and localities is important so 
they can maintain prior spending levels (Oates 2005).  State and local governments 
facing large budgetary shortfalls are often not able to fund redistributive programs for 
low-income populations.  A result of decentralization is that states and localities 
reduce their fiscal commitment to the poor, particularly in times of fiscal stress 
(Chernick and Reschovsky 2003).  The traditional justification for intergovernmental 
aid is to equalize the burden of providing standard quality public services, given 
unequal need and capacity (Warner and Pratt 2005; Warner 2001, 1999).  State and 
federal aid, as political sources of revenue, can ameliorate or exacerbate unequal 
financial capacity across local governments (Warner 1999). 
Redistribution vs. Development 
As relations between national, state, and local government have evolved over 
the last century, the three levels of government have taken on distinctively different 
domestic policy roles.  Traditionally, state and local governments manage 
developmental policies that build the physical and social infrastructure necessary for 
economic growth.  Such infrastructure includes police and fire services, mass transit 
systems, schools, roads and highways, public parks, and sanitation systems (Peterson 
1995).  On the other hand, the federal government historically has been responsible for 
redistributive policies that transfer economic resources from those who have gained 
the most from economic growth to those who have gained the least — the poor, 
unemployed, disabled, sick, elderly, and families headed by single parents.  
Historically, it levied higher taxes on businesses and the wealthy than on the poor, and 
then carried out redistribution through social welfare, healthcare, pensions, and other 
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programs aimed at needier places and populations (Peterson 1995).  Globalization 
challenges redistribution as pressures for the federal government to become more 
developmental have led to an increased reliance on the taxation of labor over capital 
during the past few decades. 
Inter-jurisdictional competition lies at the core of the federalist division of 
responsibilities.  Public choice theory argues that competition between local 
governments drives them to more efficiently provide basic public services and 
promote economic development (Tiebout 1956).  However, this same competition 
engenders a “race to the bottom” among state and local governments as they compete 
for development (Donahue 1997).  In reality, there is some overlap between the roles 
of federal, state, and local government.  This study aims to disentangle the 
redistributive and developmental effects of government policies at all three levels. 
As a result of the limitations placed on local government, it typically 
concentrates on developmental objectives.  Infrastructure development is a function 
that local government can perform because decentralization allows for a better match 
between the supply of public services and their variable demand (Peterson 1981).  
Local governments are close to their constituencies and possess knowledge of local 
needs, conditions, and circumstances that is not available to higher levels of 
government.  It is impossible for a national government to determine the particular 
preferences of residents in the myriad of decentralized jurisdictions that make up the 
nation as a whole (Oates 2005).  By taking geographic differences into account, 
developmental policies that are sensitive to particular local needs for infrastructure and 
human capital can be effective for promoting economic growth (Oates 1999).  
However, decentralization can also challenge regional integration and coordination of 
the infrastructure so critical to economic development, leading to fragmentation. 
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For the same reason that local government is suited to promoting economic 
development — the mobility of labor and capital — it faces difficulty redistributing 
wealth and income (Peterson 1995).  Attempts by local governments to redress income 
disparities can result in the poor who reside in wealthier areas faring better than the 
poor who live in more deprived areas.  Households in different localities having the 
same income before redistribution may have different incomes after redistribution, due 
to differing income levels and redistribution policies between local governments 
(Prud’homme 1995a). 
The capacity of state and local governments to manage public assistance 
programs varies widely across jurisdictions.  The mismatch between the need of a 
state or locality measured by its poor population, and its fiscal resources measured by 
per capita income, suggests the need for some redistribution at the federal level (Ladd 
and Doolittle 1982).  Unlike the federal government, all of the states have either 
constitutional or statutory provisions requiring a balanced budget each fiscal year, 
constraining the deficits states can accumulate (Chernick and Reschovsky 2003; Ladd 
and Doolittle 1982; Stein and Hamm 1994, 1987).  Local government is called the 
developmental state, unlikely to invest in redistributive expenditures because these 
generally do not promote economic growth, productivity, or the local tax base (Warner 
and Pratt 2005; Warner 2001).  In their eagerness to promote economic development, 
state and local officials tend to hold down tax rates, and therefore outputs of public 
services, to reduce costs for businesses.  Fear of losing local businesses and high 
income residents can lead to a “race to the bottom” with suboptimal outputs of public 
goods and services. 
History of Centralization and Decentralization 
Throughout the nation’s history, the distribution of responsibility across the 
various levels of government has not been static, but has evolved to meet the 
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challenges of the day and the public’s needs (Sharp and Parisi 2003).  Over the course 
of the twentieth century, tensions between federal and state-level authority have led to 
both decentralizing and recentralizing tendencies in U.S. public finance (Kodras 
1997a; Warner and Pratt 2005).  Federal authority expanded in the twentieth century 
during national economic, cultural, and social crises when state and local governments 
were unable or unwilling to address the essentials of these crises.  During these times, 
states and localities were identified as part of the problem, not the solution (Swanson 
2001b).  Three general periods of expansion in federal authority may be identified: 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs of the 1930s in response to the 
Great Depression, the planned war economy of World War II, and President Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society programs of the 1960s in response to the Civil Rights 
movement (Kodras 1997a; Swanson 2001b).  Economists often characterize the 
expansion of governmental power as a response to market failures.  Each of these 
periods is characterized by the inability of the economy to provide market-based 
mechanisms that adequately addressed the crises, whether economic, cultural, or social 
(Swanson 2001b). 
In the 1930s and 1940s, as a result of the Great Depression, the New Deal, and 
World War II, the federal government took on greater responsibility for economic and 
social welfare.  Social security, unemployment assistance, and greater involvement in 
economic planning and regulation were roles taken on by the national government.  
There was also an expansion of federal fiscal and bureaucratic capacity (Sharp and 
Parisi 2003).  Social equity across populations was pursued in two major ways: by 
increasing direct income transfers from government and by increasing the size of 
government services (Lobao and Hooks 2003). 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the role of the federal government further 
increased with the development of additional social programs directed at eradicating 
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poverty, and the setting of national standards related to health and environmental 
quality (Sharp and Parisi 2003).  The national government recognized that the high 
incidence of poverty among workers in low-level occupations, the elderly, children, 
minorities, and women could not be directly addressed by general economic growth, 
and thus expanded its role in social provision with a set of initiatives known as the 
War on Poverty (Kodras 1997b).  Great Society legislation centralized social safety-
net programs within the federal government.  These social justice programs sought to 
address the considerable gaps confronted by citizens who are poor or of color to have 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  Local areas and states were considered to have 
denied Constitutional rights to citizens, so the federal government was given the 
authority to secure these rights (Swanson 2001a). 
The expanded role of national government resulted in a variety of positive 
outcomes, including reductions in poverty and improved civil rights protections.  But 
there were problems associated with the federal government’s increased programmatic 
responsibilities, including growing conflicts between federal and state or local 
governments, perceptions by some of an intrusive national government, ideological 
concerns about an activist federal government, and a preference for greater local 
authority.  As a result of these administrative and philosophical concerns, a tendency 
toward devolution of governmental functions and responsibilities began to emerge in 
the 1970s (Sharp and Parisi 2003).  Since the 1970s, responsibility for a broad range of 
policy activities has become increasingly decentralized, with state and local 
governments playing a growing role in policy formation and implementation.  
Changes in the organization and administration of many federal programs has shifted 
responsibility to state and local governments and in many cases reduced government 
regulation in favor of presumed market efficiencies (Dewees et al. 2003). 
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The decentralization that occurred during the administrations of Presidents 
Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford in the 1970s reflected a belief that federal government 
could play a role in targeting federal funding to people and places that were not 
prospering (Warner 1999).  Federal aid to localities increased significantly, reaching 
its peak in 1977, in an effort to reduce inequality across local governments.  General 
revenue sharing began in 1973, bringing direct federal aid to many local governments 
for the first time (Warner and Pratt 2005; Warner 2001).  Local governments were also 
given the freedom to allocate funds within a single, broad policy arena through the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 and Community Development 
Block Grants which began in 1974 (Warner 1999).  These national programs provided 
local governments with substantial resources that they could use for economic 
development purposes (Sharp and Parisi 2003). 
During the 1980s, under President Ronald Reagan’s New Federalism, the 
federal government began transferring to states and localities many of the services it 
had funded since the 1970s, leaving lower levels of government to pay for them if they 
could (Johnson et al. 1995; Katz 2001; Warner 2006).  These unfunded mandates 
restricted local government options and increased revenue pressure on already hard-hit 
local taxpayers (Johnson et al. 1995; Yinger 1990).  General revenue sharing to states 
ended in 1980 and was phased out for localities in 1986 (Warner and Pratt 2005).  
Federal resources for local economic development began to diminish, resulting in 
local communities either relying more on state level resources, attempting to identify 
new local resources, or both (Sharp and Parisi 2003). 
In the 1990s, states and localities called for relief from unfunded mandates as 
they struggled to meet the challenges of devolution.  The administration of President 
Bill Clinton responded by allowing more state and local control over policy 
determination, particularly in areas such as welfare entitlement and service levels 
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(Warner and Pratt 2005; Warner 2006, 2001).  Some direct federal programs were cut 
back and converted into fixed state block grants over which states and localities have 
wider discretion.  Although such policies may reduce local government fiscal burden, 
they lead to a varied landscape of entitlement and social rights (Warner and Pratt 
2005). 
Devolution Pro vs. Con 
Devolution or decentralization refers to the process whereby federal 
government transfers some degree of responsibility for the control, development, and 
support of public policy to state and local government.  This process is viewed as a 
means to increase the efficiency and flexibility of public policy to better serve diverse 
local populations (Sharp and Parisi 2003).  There are two types of devolution: fiscal 
and administrative.  Fiscal decentralization shifts financing responsibility to the level 
of government closest to the service delivery point, thus promoting efficiency through 
fiscal equivalence.  On the other hand, administrative decentralization involves 
making decisions closer to the end beneficiary to increase diversity and 
responsiveness, but it requires a level of administrative and technical capacity that is 
sometimes lacking, especially in rural areas.  Administrative decentralization can 
provide a cover for dismantling popular government services because it is often 
accompanied by fiscal decentralization. 
In theory, administrative decentralization presents an opportunity for lower 
levels of government closer to the populace to design policies and programs tailored to 
local needs, preferences, and capacities (Dewees et al. 2003; Kodras 1997a; Lobao and 
Kraybill 2005; Oates 1999; Swanson 2001a; Tadlock et al. 2005).  Increased local 
participation may make federal programs more locally appropriate (Swanson 2001b).  
However, even when local governments do respond to local preferences, policies 
enacted to serve the interests of the local majority may fail to protect the economically 
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and politically disenfranchised (Kodras 1997a).  In a study conducted by Tadlock et al. 
(2005), county commissioners generally welcomed local control and responsibility for 
the design and implementation of programs.  The commissioners viewed county 
governments as particularly well-situated for fostering locally-based democratic input.  
Nonetheless, the study concluded that many problems confronted by county 
commissioners such as persistent poverty, high unemployment, inadequate 
infrastructure, and a shortage of social services require structural solutions that are 
beyond the capability of county governments to resolve. 
For localities with abundant resources and a history of civic engagement, 
devolution may result in enhanced community and resident well-being.  But in areas 
with fewer resources and limited civic capacity, the shift of responsibilities to the local 
level may not achieve these intended goals (Sharp and Parisi 2003).  Swanson (2001b) 
found that success of locality-based programs depends on local democracy and the 
quality of local social, economic, and physical infrastructures.  In practice, 
decentralization has generally not passed down the resources necessary for program 
implementation, but only some programmatic autonomy.  An unintended consequence 
of devolution is the creation of unfunded mandates for program development and 
delivery at the local level (Swanson 2001a).  Many local governments experience a 
mismatch between devolved program responsibilities and resources, resulting in 
higher fiscal stress (Lobao and Kraybill 2005).  If county governments are to 
successfully design and implement more policies under federal devolution, the states 
must provide counties with more resources commensurate with the newfound 
responsibilities (Tadlock et al. 2005). 
The capacity to take on increasing fiscal responsibilities under decentralization 
is determined by the extent to which fiscal resources, expertise, infrastructure, and 
political will exist, or can be cultivated, within particular localities.  Generally, areas 
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with the greatest need for services have the least resources, and often the least political 
will, to address those needs (Kodras 1997a).  Decentralization works the best in 
contexts where inequality across jurisdictions is low.  But in the U.S., spatial 
inequality is increasing more so within areas than between areas, in part as a result of 
decentralization itself (Warner 2006).  Critics point out that the limited fiscal, 
technical, and civic capacity of many communities can pose a serious problem for 
meeting local needs.  This outcome suggests the ongoing necessity for funding 
responsibility at higher levels of government to smooth out spatial inequality (Sharp 
and Parisi 2003).  Sufficiently large transfers from the federal government to poorer 
state and local governments are a necessary corollary of fiscal devolution to 
compensate for differences in tax bases and resources (Prud’homme 1995b).  In 
practice, devolution can create severe problems in policymaking and financing at the 
local level.  Delegating problems to lower tiers displaces conflict away from the 
national government, which may engender local political battles and fiscal crises, 
especially for rural areas (Kodras 1997a). 
As a consequence of the constraints faced by localities, the state plays a 
significant role in managing space on a larger scale than local government.  If 
devolution is to promote efficiency without intensifying inequality, then the response 
of state policy is crucial (Warner and Pratt 2005).  Although theory argues that 
redistributive spending is best made at the federal level of government, under 
devolution, state policy is becoming the more significant arena for redistributive 
activity (Warner 2001).  Communities within a given state are more homogeneous 
than localities scattered across the nation, making it easier for state policymakers to 
design need-based formulas to guide aid allocation decisions (Pelissero and Morgan 
1992). 
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Warner (2001) found that although redistribution cannot be sustained by local 
government, state government is a high enough level to allow for redistribution 
through state aid and state centralization.  State centralization measures the degree of 
centralization in fiscal responsibility for governmental services.  State aid and state 
centralization give local governments more programmatic flexibility in using own-
source revenues, as the financing of some activities is shifted to state dollars (Johnson 
et al. 1995).  Using U.S. Census of Governments data for 1977, 1982, and 1987, 
Johnson et al. (1995) found that greater state centralization and higher percentages of 
revenue from federal and state sources were significantly associated with lower fiscal 
burden among counties.  The most influential factor on the level of fiscal burden was 
intergovernmental assistance from the state to local government.  Drawing upon more 
recent U.S. Census of Governments data for 1987 and 1992, other researchers 
concluded that state centralization has the largest impact on relieving local fiscal stress 
of any variable, including state aid (Warner and Pratt 2005; Warner 2001). 
This study focuses on rural areas, which are especially disadvantaged in 
confronting the challenges of devolution.  In particular, decentralization strains the 
local capacity of nonmetropolitan governments, requiring poor rural areas with limited 
resources to design and implement programs that do not recognize unique rural 
problems.  Lobao and Kraybill (2005) found that rural county governments are more 
likely to report significant problems under decentralization due to reduced federal 
revenues, mandates from higher levels of government, and a declining local tax base.  
The findings also indicate that nonmetropolitan governments are more likely to lack 
the capacity and resources required to successfully carry out the added functional 
responsibilities resulting from devolution.  Johnson et al. (1995) discovered that the 
level of fiscal burden on taxpayers to support local government is higher in 
nonmetropolitan areas.  Pronounced spatial clustering is apparent in the geographic 
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distribution of fiscal burden among nonmetropolitan counties as most counties 
experiencing high fiscal burden are proximate to other highly burdened counties. 
By limiting federal aid to counties, devolution may lower the condition of 
social services in nonmetropolitan areas even further.  Among unique rural problems 
are insufficient infrastructure, inadequate schools, and limited access to medical care 
and other basic public services such as clean drinking water and modern sewer 
systems (Lichter and Johnson 2007; Reeder and Jansen 1995; Sharp and Parisi 2003; 
Tadlock et al. 2005).  The low quality of rural social services inhibits business 
attraction and makes it difficult to upgrade the human capital required for economic 
growth (Lobao and Kraybill 2005). 
Analysts stressing the negative impacts of decentralization see it as 
symptomatic of broad institutional shifts in which governments at all levels have 
become less redistributive and more dominated by market relations.  This changed 
institutional environment places greater pressure on localities to engage in competitive 
economic growth activities (Lobao and Kraybill 2005).  Redistributive expenditures, 
which have never been a high priority for local governments, will be even less 
attractive in an environment focused on economic competitiveness and this will result 
in greater inequality across space (Warner and Pratt 2005).  Redistributive programs 
are thought to create dependence, whereas policies that promote competition are 
assumed to stimulate local economic development (Warner 2003).  Local governments 
engage in destructive competition to attract new businesses and investment through 
tax breaks that undermine the public infrastructure basis for long-term economic 
sustainability (Dewees et al. 2003; Prud’homme 1995a; Warner 2006).  Dewees et al. 
(2003) found that rural counties are less likely to undertake economic growth 
activities, with the observed urban-rural differences largely attributable to county 
socioeconomic disadvantages.  Rural areas constrained by lower education levels, 
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higher poverty levels, and a depressed economy struggle to compete in this new policy 
environment of increasing local fiscal responsibility and competition. 
The expanding role of local government in economic development is attributed 
to the globalization of financial markets and the intensification of competition among 
localities for mobile capital (Brenner 1999a; Lobao and Kraybill 2005).  Local 
governments feel pressured to focus on pro-growth objectives.  In a globalized world 
where peripheral rural areas must compete with urban cores for capital investment, 
intensified forms of uneven geographic development and socio-spatial polarization are 
emerging (Brenner 1999b).  Uneven development is no longer viewed as a limit to 
capital accumulation but rather as its very foundation (Brenner 2000).  Fiscal 
decentralization passes greater responsibility onto local governments, many of whom 
are incapable of exerting power within a globalized economy.  The geographic 
implications of this government restructuring differ considerably from place to place 
across the country, reflecting spatial variations in the resources and capacities of local 
governments to manage these changes (Kodras 1997a). 
Due to the pressure to compete for economic growth, counties may provide 
fewer public services, particularly social services (Lobao and Kraybill 2005).  Inter-
local competition for economic growth can prevent local governments from 
adequately providing redistributive services.  However, Lobao and Kraybill (2005) 
discovered a significant, positive correlation between economic growth and social 
service activities.  This result suggests that in contrast to a tradeoff between 
redistribution and development, some counties can expand involvement in both 
domains of activities.  Similarly, Lobao and Hooks (2003) concluded that county 
government remains important for both reducing economic inequality and promoting 
economic growth.  Most government variables responsible for reducing income 
inequality also encouraged, or at worst did not significantly deter, income growth 
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across counties.  These studies challenge the view that government’s attempts to 
ensure social equity are incompatible with long-term improvement in mass incomes. 
Research Question 
Within the context of fiscal devolution or decentralization in the United States, 
states and localities are fulfilling redistributive functions previously under the 
responsibility of the federal government.  Under fiscal federalism, the federal 
government generally implements redistributive policies while local government 
focuses on development.  The theory of fiscal federalism argues that the potential for 
redistribution may be lower at the state and local levels than at the federal level due to 
developmental pressures.  As a result, movement toward devolution could decrease 
redistributive activities and raise the potential for spatial inequality across the nation. 
This study pays particular attention to the role of state policy under 
decentralization as more responsibility for redistribution and development is delegated 
away from federal government and down to state government.  States are emerging as 
a critical component of the multilevel federalist governmental system by playing both 
redistributive and developmental roles.  The project will analyze the emergence of the 
meso level state and its important roles under devolution.  State level action plays an 
increasingly important role in the context of fiscal devolution for addressing inequality 
in local government capacity.  The states use two key policy tools to deal with the 
impacts of devolution: state aid and state centralization.  The analysis explores the 
extent to which state aid is redistributive or developmental in its focus, after 
controlling for state centralization.  As the meso level between the redistribution of the 
federal government and the development of local government, is the state capable of 
both functions? 
In order to conduct a complete study of decentralization at the micro, meso, 
and macro government levels, the federal and local government are also examined in 
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addition to the state.  The study seeks to discover if the classical theory of fiscal 
federalism is still applicable in a decentralized governmental system.  Since federal aid 
has continued to decline since reaching its peak in 1977, is federal aid to county 
governments still redistributive?  Under decentralization, some responsibility for 
redistribution is also shifted to local governments, even though the theory of fiscal 
federalism argues that this level of government is not capable of redistribution.  With 
its increased responsibilities under devolution, is local government revenue effort still 
primarily developmental in its focus, or does it now have some redistributive features? 
This research analyzes government finance during 1987-2002 for all U.S. 
counties in the lower forty-eight states to answer the following research question: Are 
federal aid, state aid, and local government revenue effort redistributive, 
developmental, or both?  In particular, the focus is on the changing roles and impacts 
of federal and state intergovernmental aid and state centralization of fiscal 
responsibility on local government revenue effort.  By looking over the 1987-2002 
time period, these evolving roles are tracked at three different governance scales: 
federal, state, and local.  The contribution of the work is to provide a global picture of 
governmental finance over a fifteen year period rather than focusing on specific 
programs.  The analysis builds on the work of several rural sociologists: Dewees et al. 
(2003); Johnson et al. (1995); Lobao and Hooks (2003); Lobao and Kraybill (2005); 
Reeder and Jansen (1995); Swanson (2001b); Tadlock et al. (2005); Warner and Pratt 
(2005); and Warner (2001).  All of these studies have a distinctively rural focus.  Due 
to the economic and demographic disadvantages faced by rural areas, this study also 
takes on a spatial component by focusing on the spatial impacts of devolution in rural 
and urban counties.  Under devolution, do spatial inequality and government poverty 
increase as poor rural areas face a lower tax base, higher needs, and more 
responsibility? 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Outline 
This chapter covers the methodology implemented to conduct the study.  First, 
the data sources utilized for the analysis are described which include the U.S. Census 
of Governments, U.S. Census of Population and Housing, and U.S.D.A. Economic 
Research Service.  Next, the implications of using the county area as a unit of analysis 
are discussed.  Then, the regression models, variables, and descriptive statistics are 
detailed.  The chapter concludes with an analysis of the modeling techniques 
employed for the project. 
Data Sources 
State- and county-level finance data were collected from the U.S. Census of 
Governments Finance Files for 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002.  Demographic data were 
retrieved from the U.S. Census of Population and Housing for 1980, 1990, and 2000.  
Three fixed-effect cross-sectional regression models were run for 1987, 1992, 1997, 
and 1992.  Next, three fixed effect generalized estimation models (GEM) were run 
including the data for all four model years in addition to significant interactions with a 
year variable to track trends over time.  Since the Census of Population is published 
decennially whereas the Census of Governments is published quinquennially, the 
cross-sectional models utilize the Census of Population data for the nearest year.  
Thus, the 1987 and 1992 models use the data for 1990, and the 1997 and 2002 models 
use the 2000 data.  The 1980 data is employed to compute change variables measuring 
growth in population and employment from 1980 to 1990. 
The year 1987 is chosen as the starting point for modeling because it is the first 
year in which state policy trends diverged from federal decentralization trends in that 
both state aid and state centralization increased while federal aid to localities 
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continued to decline since reaching its peak in 1977.  The year 2002 is selected as the 
ending point for modeling since it is the most current year for which data are 
available.  The analysis builds on the work of several rural sociologists: Dewees et al. 
(2003); Johnson et al. (1995); Lobao and Hooks (2003); Lobao and Kraybill (2005); 
Reeder and Jansen (1995); Swanson (2001b); Tadlock et al. (2005); Warner and Pratt 
(2005); and Warner (2001).  The study by Warner (2001) pulled data from the 1992 
Census of Governments and the 1990 Census of Population.  No other scholars have 
published work drawing upon more recent Census data from the late 1990s or early 
2000s.  Therefore, this research contributes a new analysis up to the 2002 Census of 
Governments and the 2000 Census of Population. 
By utilizing the most recent data available, this study expands knowledge 
concerning the effects of fiscal decentralization into the twenty-first century.  Because 
the policy context has changed greatly since the early 1990s, an update to the literature 
is necessary to see how the results reported in prior studies compare to more current 
trends.  The project includes all counties in the lower forty-eight states except Alaska, 
Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone National Park, which are excluded from 
the analysis.  Independent cities in Virginia are treated as counties.  The five boroughs 
of New York City are aggregated into one single case in the dataset. 
To facilitate comparison across years, all data measured in dollars are 
converted to constant 2000 dollars on a per capita basis.  Government finance data is 
deflated by the Implicit Price Deflator for Gross Domestic Product (U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 2007).  Per capita income is deflated by the Consumer Price Index 
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2007).  In 
order to obtain a normal distribution, the natural log of population and per capita 
income is used across all models.  For the cross-sectional models, the natural log of 
federal aid, state aid, and local effort is utilized.  For the pooled generalized estimation 
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models (GEM), federal aid, state aid, and local effort are centered using the overall 
mean for the four years in order to facilitate interpretation of the interaction terms. 
Unit of Analysis: County Areas 
In the U.S. Census of Governments County Finance Files, fiscal data for all 
local government units (school districts, towns, and villages) within a county are 
aggregated to the county area.  This minimizes measurement error because ninety 
percent of local government service provision and revenue collection is confined to a 
single county, regardless of the state (Johnson et al. 1995).  Special districts that cross 
county boundaries are counted within the county where the administrative 
headquarters is located. 
County governments provide important services that promote local economic 
development, enhance human capital, and serve social safety net functions.  Due to 
devolution, the scope of these activities has grown with the passage of time (Lobao 
and Kraybill 2005).  Counties are an important part of the nation’s local government 
apparatus, spending billions of public dollars every year to provide basic services to 
millions of residents (Dewees et al. 2003).  As a significant administrative unit, the 
county implements local, state, and federal-level programs.  Although benefits from 
federal public assistance such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families are set at 
the state level, administration is usually done through county-based offices (Lobao and 
Hooks 2003). 
County areas are a useful unit of analysis because they cover the range of 
social and economic landscapes in the nation, from entirely rural nonmetropolitan to 
dense metropolitan areas.  They vary considerably in economic infrastructure, 
demographic profile, and level of prosperity (Lobao and Hooks 2003; Nielsen and 
Alderson 1997).  Because county areas are smaller than states and labor market areas, 
they are less likely to obscure within-area differences and result in the loss of 
 21
information (Lobao and Hooks 2003).  County areas are also helpful for the 
examination of changes over time for the same fixed area since their boundaries are 
generally more stable than cities or labor markets, except in the case of Virginia with 
its independent cities (Lichter and Johnson 2007; Lobao and Hooks 2003). 
It is important to note that the states, not counties, are the constitutional units 
in the U.S.  To a large extent, states make the rules under which local governments 
operate and these vary widely from state to state.  For example, states require county 
governments to provide certain services and centralize responsibilities for other 
services from local governments to the state.  States decide which taxes local 
governments are allowed to levy and may also place restrictions on county tax 
definitions and tax rates (Yinger 1990; Yinger and Ladd 1989).  Some county 
governments operate under very favorable rules, whereas others have limited access to 
taxes and are assigned more extensive service responsibilities. 
Regression Modeling 
To answer the research question of whether federal aid, state aid, and local 
effort are redistributive or developmental, this study utilizes a fixed effect cross-
sectional and generalized estimation modeling approach.  The purpose of statistical 
modeling is to explain variation in levels of the three dependent variables: federal aid, 
state aid, and local effort.  The analysis of these three variables provides a thorough 
study of decentralization at the macro, meso, and micro government levels.  Three 
fixed-effect cross-sectional regression models are run for 1987, 1992, 1997, and 1992.  
Next, three fixed effect generalized estimation models (GEM) are run including the 
data for all four model years in addition to significant interactions with a year variable 
to track trends over time.  All three dependent variables (federal aid, state aid, and 
local effort) and three independent variables (state centralization, percent poverty, and 
percent employment growth) were tested for significant interactions with the year 
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variable.  Only significant interactions were retained in the models.  The continuous 
year variable is coded as 0=1987, 1=1992, 2=1997, and 3=2002 to enable 
interpretation of the results at five-year time intervals.  The regression models 
disentangle the following factors: the redistributive vs. developmental nature federal 
aid, state aid, and local effort; the spatial distribution of these effects; economies of 
scale; local capacity; the role of state policy (state centralization); and substitutes.  The 
three models may be stated as follows: 
Federal Aid = f {redistribution (percent poverty, percent unemployment, percent 
dependent, percent white, percent old housing); development (percent population 
growth, percent employment growth, percent high school graduate); spatial effects 
(nonmetro nonadjacent, nonmetro federal land, percent urban, percent out-
commuting); economies of scale (population, population density, population density 
squared); local capacity (per capita income); state policy (state centralization); and 
substitutes (state aid, local effort)} 
State Aid = f {redistribution (percent poverty, percent unemployment, percent 
dependent, percent white, percent old housing); development (percent population 
growth, percent employment growth, percent high school graduate); spatial effects 
(nonmetro nonadjacent, nonmetro federal land, percent urban, percent out-
commuting); economies of scale (population, population density, population density 
squared); local capacity (per capita income); state policy (state centralization); and 
substitutes (federal aid, local effort)} 
Local Effort = f {redistribution (percent poverty, percent unemployment, percent 
dependent, percent white, percent old housing); development (percent population 
growth, percent employment growth, percent high school graduate); spatial effects 
(nonmetro nonadjacent, nonmetro federal land, percent urban, percent out-
commuting); economies of scale (population, population density, population density 
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squared); local capacity (per capita income); income homogeneity (Gini coefficient); 
state policy (state centralization); and substitutes (federal aid, state aid)} 
Previous studies of devolution have employed both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods.  Swanson (2001b) analyzed case studies to assess the effectiveness 
of locality-based policy.  Tadlock et al. (2005) conducted surveys and in-depth 
interviews of county commissioners to document their experiences with 
decentralization.  Other researchers used surveys and then statistical modeling to 
interpret the survey results (Dewees et al. 2003; Lobao and Kraybill 2005).  Some 
scholars obtained their data from the U.S. Census of Governments and the U.S. 
Census of Population and Housing to construct and run statistical models (Johnson et 
al. 1995; Lobao and Hooks 2003; Reeder and Jansen 1995; Warner and Pratt 2005; 
Warner 2001).  Such modeling techniques include ordinary least squares (Johnson et 
al. 1995; Lobao and Kraybill 2005; Reeder and Jansen 1995), weighted least squares 
(Warner 2001), fixed effect and change models (Lobao and Hooks 2003), neural 
network and classification tree analysis (Warner and Pratt 2005), and logistic 
regression (Dewees et al. 2003).  No previous devolution study has implemented a 
generalized estimation model to analyze pooled data for several years in a single 
model. 
Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 include data for the three dependent variables: federal 
aid, state aid, and local effort.  Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for all counties 
included in the models and Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 break this data down into rural and 
urban counties using Rural-Urban Continuum Codes.  The U.S.D.A. Economic 
Research Service publishes Rural-Urban Continuum Codes after each decennial 
census to form a classification scheme distinguishing metropolitan counties by their 
population size and nonmetropolitan counties by their degree of urbanization and 
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proximity to a metropolitan area.  The metropolitan and nonmetropolitan categories 
are subdivided into three metropolitan and six nonmetropolitan groupings, resulting in 
a nine-part county codification.  Table 2 disaggregates the descriptive statistics for 
nonmetropolitan counties.  Nonmetropolitan counties have the following Rural-Urban 
Continuum Codes: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 (U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service 1993, 
2003).  Table 3 breaks down the nonmetropolitan counties further into nonadjacent 
counties, while Table 4 provides statistics for adjacent counties.  The Rural-Urban 
Continuum Codes for nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties are 5, 7, and 9, and the 
Codes for nonmetropolitan adjacent counties are 4, 6, and 8 (U.S.D.A. Economic 
Research Service 1993, 2003). 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for metropolitan counties included in the 
study.  Metropolitan counties have the following Rural-Urban Continuum Codes: 0, 1, 
2, and 3 for 1993 and 1, 2, and 3 for 2003 (U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service 
1993, 2003).  In 1993, metropolitan areas of one million population or more were 
subdivided between central counties (Code 0) and fringe counties (Code 1).  In 2003, 
the fringe distinction was dropped, and the previous Codes 0 and 1 were combined to 
create the new Code 1 which now represents all counties in metropolitan areas of one 
million population or more. 
Dependent Variables 
The three dependent variables tested by this research are federal aid, state aid, 
and local effort.  The federal aid variable includes all direct federal aid to 
governmental units in counties.  It does not include payments to individuals or 
intergovernmental transfers, which are netted out.  If federal aid is channeled through 
the state, then it is counted under state aid because decisions about how to redistribute 
the funds are made at the state level.  Federal aid is a summation of the following
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. County Areas 
U.S. Census of Governments and U.S.D.A. Variables 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Federal Aid Per Capita2 ($) 78.39 (99.24) 65.28 (97.74) 76.38 (143.80) 88.35 (132.06) 
State Aid Per Capita2 ($) 748.76 (326.95) 917.66 (383.02) 992.25 (403.74) 1,130.36 (456.30) 
Local Revenue Per Capita2 ($) 1,205.87 (798.53) 1,375.76 (890.64) 1,470.00 (926.80) 1,588.02 (900.72) 
Local Effort Per Capita2 .08 (.06) .09 (.06) .08 (.05) .09 (.05) 
Low State Centralization2 .34 (.01) .37 (.02) .36 (.01) .37 (.02) 
Medium State Centralization2 .43 (.03) .45 (.03) .43 (.02) .45 (.04) 
High State Centralization2 .54 (.03) .55 (.02) .54 (.02) .58 (.02) 
Nonmetro Nonadjacent3 .41 (.49) .40 (.49) .31 (.46) .31 (.46) 
Nonmetro Federal Land3 .08 (.28) .09 (.29) .09 (.28) .09 (.28) 
N 3,059 2,876 2,990 3,014 
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Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 
2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Sources: 2U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002); 3U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service (1989, 1993, 2003) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Nonmetropolitan County Areas 
U.S. Census of Governments and U.S.D.A. Variables 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Federal Aid Per Capita2 ($) 78.78 (103.44) 65.73 (106.61) 82.91 (168.55) 93.61 (152.12) 
State Aid Per Capita2 ($) 771.58 (339.77) 945.83 (394.74) 1,047.35 (426.35) 1,170.03 (474.62) 
Local Revenue Per Capita2 ($) 1,219.61 (879.59) 1,344.01 (976.07) 1,493.11 (1,035.01) 1,567.45 (957.12) 
Local Effort Per Capita2 .09 (.06) .10 (.07) .09 (.06) .10 (.05) 
Nonmetro Nonadjacent3 .56 (.50) .56 (.50) .47 (.50) .47 (.50) 
Nonmetro Federal Land3 .11 (.32) .12 (.33) .11 (.32) .11 (.32) 
N 2,253 2,087 1,950 1,966 
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Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) 
Nonmetropolitan U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Yellowstone National Park; N = 2,253 (1987), 2,087 (1992), 
1,950 (1997), 1,966 (2002) 
Nonmetropolitan counties have the following Rural-Urban Continuum Codes: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service 
(1993, 2003) 
Sources: 2U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002); 3U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service (1989, 1993, 2003) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Nonmetropolitan Nonadjacent County Areas 
U.S. Census of Governments and U.S.D.A. Variables 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Federal Aid Per Capita2 ($) 90.73 (124.20) 80.69 (121.78) 95.58 (150.69) 107.27 (158.13) 
State Aid Per Capita2 ($) 781.18 (376.71) 950.23 (422.30) 1,080.60 (460.86) 1,185.94 (491.59) 
Local Revenue Per Capita2 ($) 1,414.97 (1,036.41) 1,507.43 (1,208.92) 1,652.41 (1,190.89) 1,712.31 (1,077.74) 
Local Effort Per Capita2 .10 (.07) .11 (.08) .10 (.06) .11 (.06) 
Nonmetro Federal Land3 .14 (.35) .16 (.36) .15 (.35) .14 (.35) 
N 1,268 1,161 923 932 
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Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) 
Nonmetropolitan Nonadjacent U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska and Hawaii; N = 1,268 (1987), 1,161 (1992), 923 (1997), 932 
(2002) 
Nonmetropolitan Nonadjacent counties have the following Rural-Urban Continuum Codes: 5, 7, 9; U.S.D.A. Economic Research 
Service (1993, 2003) 
Sources: 2U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002); 3U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service (1989) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Nonmetropolitan Adjacent County Areas 
U.S. Census of Governments and U.S.D.A. Variables 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Federal Aid Per Capita2 ($) 66.70 (72.98) 50.32 (88.48) 65.65 (201.80) 72.91 (85.67) 
State Aid Per Capita2 ($) 768.42 (313.34) 943.89 (355.58) 1,007.21 (364.62) 1,149.11 (424.09) 
Local Revenue Per Capita2 ($) 1,098.00 (679.04) 1,239.08 (767.29) 1,354.84 (873.69) 1,442.38 (806.37) 
Local Effort Per Capita2 .08 (.05) .09 (.06) .08 (.05) .09 (.05) 
Nonmetro Federal Land3 .06 (.24) .06 (.24) .06 (.24) .06 (.24) 
N 985 926 1,027 1,034 
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Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) 
Nonmetropolitan Adjacent U.S. County Areas; N = 985 (1987), 926 (1992), 1,027 (1997), 1,034 (2002) 
Nonmetropolitan Adjacent counties have the following Rural-Urban Continuum Codes: 4, 6, 8; U.S.D.A. Economic Research 
Service (1993, 2003) 
Sources: 2U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002); 3U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service (1989) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Metropolitan County Areas 
U.S. Census of Governments Variables 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Federal Aid Per Capita ($) 77.30 (86.47) 64.08 (69.01) 64.13 (77.28) 78.48 (81.30) 
State Aid Per Capita ($) 684.98 (278.53) 843.15 (339.27) 888.92 (334.02) 1,055.92 (409.74) 
Local Revenue Per Capita ($) 1,167.46 (524.89) 1,459.74 (601.95) 1,426.66 (677.25) 1,626.60 (783.04) 
Local Effort Per Capita .07 (.03) .08 (.03) .07 (.03) .08 (.04) 
N 806 789 1,040 1,048 
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Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) 
Metropolitan U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington, D.C.; N = 806 (1987), 789 (1992), 1,040 (1997), 
1,048 (2002) 
Metropolitan counties have the following Rural-Urban Continuum Codes: 0, 1, 2, 3 (1993); 1, 2, 3 (2003); U.S.D.A. Economic 
Research Service 
Source: U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100
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Figure 1: Federal Aid Trends 1987-2002 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Source: U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002) 
Based on GEM regression results 
 
federal intergovernmental categories: agriculture, air transport, education, employment 
security, general revenue sharing, general support, health and hospitals, highways, 
housing and community development, other natural resources, public welfare, 
sewerage, and transit subsidies.  The average federal aid per capita to all counties 
increased slightly from $78.39 in 1987 to $88.35 in 2002 in constant 2000 dollars 
(Table 1).  Figure 1 shows the estimated marginal means of federal aid per capita 
centered based on the GEM regression results, but this graph is more reflective of the 
metropolitan trend than of that for all counties.  The graph indicates a decline in 
federal aid and an increase starting in 2002.  For all counties, the increase began in 
1997, but it started in 2002 for metropolitan counties only.  Federal aid is higher for 
nonmetropolitan counties, increasing from $78.78 in 1987 to $93.61 in 2002 (Table 2).  
Federal aid is lower in metropolitan counties which barely increased from $77.30 in 
1987 to $78.48 in 2002 (Table 5).  The highest level of federal aid is found in 
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Figure 2: State Aid Trends 1987-2002 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Source: U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002) 
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nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties, where it increased from $90.73 in 1987 to 
$107.27 in 2002 (Table 3).  The lowest level of federal aid is found in nonmetropolitan 
adjacent counties, where it increased from $66.70 in 1987 to $72.91 in 2002 (Table 4).  
Since most federal aid goes directly to individuals, direct aid per capita to places (the 
variable measured here) is relatively small. 
The state aid variable includes all state aid to governmental units in counties 
and federal funds that pass through the state.  State aid is a summation of the following 
state intergovernmental categories: education, federal welfare, general support, health 
and hospitals, highways, housing and community development, tax relief, transit 
subsidies, public welfare, and sewerage.  The average state aid per capita to all 
counties increased in real terms from $748.76 in 1987 to $1,130.36 in 2002 (Table 1).  
Figure 2 provides the estimated marginal means of state aid per capita centered based 
on the GEM regression results.  The graph demonstrates the increase in state aid over 
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Figure 3: Local Effort Trends 1987-2002 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Source: U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002) 
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time for all counties.  For metropolitan counties, however, state aid only slightly 
increased from 1992 to 1997.  State aid is higher for nonmetropolitan counties, which 
increased from $771.58 in 1987 to $1,170.03 in 2002 (Table 2).  State aid is lowest in 
metropolitan counties which had a smaller increase from $684.98 in 1987 to $1,055.92 
in 2002 (Table 5).  The highest level of state aid is in nonmetropolitan nonadjacent 
counties, where it rose from $781.18 in 1987 to $1,185.94 in 2002 (Table 3).  State aid 
also increased in nonmetropolitan adjacent counties from $768.42 in 1987 to 
$1,149.11 in 2002 (Table 4). 
The local effort variable is a relative measure of the tax burden and a proxy for 
fiscal stress, but it may also reflect preference for higher or lower levels of spending.  
The variable is calculated as the ratio of locally raised revenue per capita to per capita 
income.  Per capita income measures local economic well-being and the fiscal 
capacity to raise revenues.  Locally raised revenue includes local taxes, user charges, 
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Figure 4: Fiscal Devolution 1987-2002 (In Dollars) 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Source: U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100 
 
and miscellaneous revenue.  Figure 3 displays the estimated marginal means of local 
effort per capita centered based on the GEM regression results.  This figure illustrates 
how local effort is countercyclical and rose for all counties from .08 to .09 for 1987 to 
1992 and 1997 to 2002 due to recessions in the national economy occurring between 
1987 to 1992 and 1997 to 2002.  Likewise, local effort fell slightly from .09 to .08 for 
1992 to 1997 because of improved economic performance and growth (Table 1).  Both 
nonmetropolitan and metropolitan counties follow the same national trend; however, 
effort fluctuates between .09 and .10 for rural areas and between .07 and .08 for urban 
areas, confirming higher and lower effort levels for these two respective areas (Tables 
2 and 5).  Local effort is highest in nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties which 
vacillate between .10 and .11 (Table 3).  It varies between .08 and .09 in 
nonmetropolitan adjacent counties (Table 4).  Lower effort is found in urban areas 
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U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
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which have higher incomes and capacity so they can provide more services.  For rural 
counties, higher effort reflects lower incomes in the face of minimum service-
provision levels and the higher cost of providing essential services resulting from 
diseconomies of scale.  To determine whether federal aid, state aid, and local effort are 
substitutes or complements to each other, these variables are included in each model. 
Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate trends for the three components of county 
government revenue over the 1987-2002 period studied: federal aid, state aid, and 
locally raised revenue.  Figure 4 presents the data in constant 2000 dollars and Figure 
5 provides the same data in percents.  Federal aid is the smallest source of local 
government revenue and has remained relatively stable in dollar terms but fallen 
slightly from 4 percent of revenue in 1987 to only 3 percent for the following years.  
State aid is the second highest source of revenue and has risen throughout the 
timeframe both in dollars and as a percentage from 37 percent in 1987 to 40 percent in 
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Figure 6: Locally Raised Revenue 1987-2002 (In Dollars) 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Source: U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002) 
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2002.  Locally raised revenue accounts for the largest share of revenue and has 
increased in dollars but declined as a percentage from 59 percent in 1987 to 57 percent 
in 2002.  This slight decrease in the proportion of locally raised revenue is offset by 
the increasing importance of state aid. 
Locally raised revenue consists of local taxes, user charges, and miscellaneous 
revenue.  The level of locally raised revenue varies across counties according to need, 
the cost of service delivery, and the capacity to raise revenue (Warner and Pratt 2005; 
Warner 1999).  Figures 6 and 7 show the trends for the components of locally raised 
revenue over 1987-2002.  Figure 6 presents the data in constant 2000 dollars and 
Figure 7 provides the same data in percents.  The highest source of locally raised 
revenue is local taxes which has grown in dollars but declined as a percentage from 60 
percent in 1987 to 58 percent for the following years.  Local taxes are composed
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primarily of the property tax, although sales taxes have also increased over time in 
dollars.  User charges are the second largest source of locally raised revenue and have 
grown in both dollar terms and as a percentage and from 24 percent in 1987 to 29 
percent in 2002.  Miscellaneous revenue is the smallest source of locally raised 
revenue and has remained relatively flat in dollars but decreased as a percentage from 
16 percent in 1987 to 13 percent in 2002. 
Independent Variables 
Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 include data for the independent variables.  Table 6 
displays descriptive statistics for all counties included in the models.  Table 7 
disaggregates these descriptive statistics for nonmetropolitan counties.  Table 8 breaks 
down the nonmetropolitan counties further into nonadjacent counties, while Table 9 
provides statistics for adjacent counties.  Table 10 presents descriptive statistics for 
metropolitan counties included in the study.  The U.S. Census of Population is
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. County Areas 
U.S. Census of Population and Housing Variables 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Population 80,007.05 (290,460.89) 84,416.17 (299,005.49) 92,542.88 (324,887.91) 91,887.10 (323,678.55) 
Percent Population Growth .04 (.17) .05 (.17) .11 (.16) .11 (.16) 
Population Density 157.91 (752.79) 166.43 (775.57) 177.73 (812.15) 176.68 (809.05) 
Population Density Squared 591,446.88 (12,033,787.51) 
628,999.29 
(12,409,917.88) 
690,957.86 
(14,623,446.53) 
685,560.85 
(14,565,213.85) 
Per Capita Income ($) 14,610.53 (3,463.31) 14,673.21 (3,501.08) 17,475.74 (3,885.80) 17,473.95 (3,877.35) 
Percent Urban .36 (.29) .37 (.29) .40 (.30) .40 (.30) 
Percent Poverty .17 (.08) .17 (.08) .14 (.07) .14 (.07) 
Percent Unemployment .07 (.03) .07 (.03) .06 (.03) .06 (.03) 
Percent Employment Growth .13 (.20) .13 (.21) .15 (.17) .15 (.17) 
Percent Out-Commuting .28 (.17) .27 (.17) .33 (.18) .33 (.18) 
Percent High School Graduate .70 (.10) .70 (.10) .77 (.09) .77 (.09) 
Percent Dependent .42 (.04) .42 (.04) .40 (.04) .40 (.04) 
Percent White .88 (.15) .88 (.15) .85 (.16) .85 (.16) 
Percent Old Housing .41 (.14) .41 (.14) .36 (.16) .36 (.16) 
Gini Coefficient .42 (.04) .42 (.04) .43 (.04) .43 (.04) 
N 3,059 2,876 2,990 3,014 
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Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 
2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Source: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Nonmetropolitan County Areas 
U.S. Census of Population and Housing Variables 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Population 22,223.42 (20,845.97) 23,238.05 (21,154.82) 24,525.38 (22,760.99) 24,350.51 (22,756.63) 
Percent Population Growth .003 (.13) .007 (.13) .08 (.14) .08 (.14) 
Population Density 36.40 (40.79) 37.69 (41.67) 39.26 (39.96) 38.96 (39.94) 
Population Density Squared 2,988.31 (16,147.67) 3,156.67 (16,758.48) 3,137.42 (7,182.46) 3,112.09 (7,158.21) 
Per Capita Income ($) 13,466.17 (2,392.43) 13,473.45 (2,391.64) 16,143.78 (2,802.93) 16,145.11 (2,786.72) 
Percent Urban .26 (.24) .27 (.23) .30 (.25) .30 (.25) 
Percent Poverty .18 (.08) .18 (.08) .16 (.07) .16 (.07) 
Percent Unemployment .07 (.03) .07 (.03) .06 (.03) .06 (.03) 
Percent Employment Growth .08 (.16) .08 (.16) .12 (.15) .12 (.15) 
Percent Out-Commuting .25 (.15) .25 (.15) .29 (.14) .29 (.14) 
Percent High School Graduate .68 (.10) .68 (.10) .76 (.09) .76 (.09) 
Percent Dependent .43 (.04) .43 (.04) .41 (.04) .41 (.04) 
Percent White .88 (.16) .88 (.16) .86 (.16) .86 (.16) 
Percent Old Housing .41 (.14) .43 (.14) .39 (.15) .39 (.15) 
Gini Coefficient .43 (.04) .43 (.04) .44 (.04) .44 (.04) 
N 2,253 2,087 1,950 1,966 
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Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) 
Nonmetropolitan U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Yellowstone National Park; N = 2,253 (1987), 2,087 (1992), 
1,950 (1997), 1,966 (2002) 
Nonmetropolitan counties have the following Rural-Urban Continuum Codes: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service 
(1993, 2003) 
Source: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100 
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Nonmetropolitan Nonadjacent County Areas 
U.S. Census of Population and Housing Variables 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Population 15,790.05 (15,405.27) 16,704.86 (15,714.27) 17,252.11 (16,606.02) 17,143.62 (16,590.67) 
Percent Population Growth -.03 (.12) -.03 (.12) .05 (.14) .05 (.14) 
Population Density 24.47 (27.96) 25.55 (28.54) 26.70 (30.55) 26.55 (30.53) 
Population Density Squared 1,379.79 (3,653.69) 1,466.14 (3,809.86) 1,645.12 (4,430.60) 1,636.31 (4,413.98) 
Per Capita Income ($) 13,222.62 (2,457.34) 13,202.70 (2,448.37) 16,009.76 (3,001.96) 16,008.88 (2,966.89) 
Percent Urban .25 (.26) .27 (.26) .28 (.27) .28 (.27) 
Percent Poverty .19 (.08) .19 (.09) .16 (.07) .16 (.07) 
Percent Unemployment .07 (.04) .07 (.04) .06 (.03) .06 (.03) 
Percent Employment Growth .03 (.15) .04 (.15) .10 (.16) .10 (.15) 
Percent Out-Commuting .19 (.13) .19 (.13) .24 (.15) .24 (.14) 
Percent High School Graduate .69 (.11) .69 (.11) .77 (.09) .77 (.09) 
Percent Dependent .44 (.04) .44 (.04) .42 (.04) .42 (.04) 
Percent White .90 (.15) .90 (.15) .88 (.16) .88 (.16) 
Percent Old Housing .46 (.14) .46 (.14) .42 (.16) .42 (.16) 
Gini Coefficient .43 (.04) .43 (.04) .44 (.04) .44 (.04) 
N 1,268 1,161 923 932 
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Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) 
Nonmetropolitan Nonadjacent U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska and Hawaii; N = 1,268 (1987), 1,161 (1992), 923 (1997), 932 
(2002) 
Nonmetropolitan Nonadjacent counties have the following Rural-Urban Continuum Codes: 5, 7, 9; U.S.D.A. Economic Research 
Service (1993, 2003) 
Source: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100 
 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Nonmetropolitan Adjacent County Areas 
U.S. Census of Population and Housing Variables 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Population 28,837.07 (22,829.77) 29,673.56 (22,924.06) 32,357.61 (25,255.24) 32,019.90 (25,338.27) 
Percent Population Growth .03 (.13) .03 (.13) .10 (.12) .10 (.12) 
Population Density 46.56 (38.54) 47.65 (38.76) 52.03 (42.42) 51.32 (42.57) 
Population Density Squared 3,651.35 (6,644.44) 3,770.67 (6,760.07) 4,504.23 (7,980.46) 4,443.75 (7,956.73) 
Per Capita Income ($) 13,735.21 (2,249.10) 13,726.45 (2,241.97) 16,385.68 (2,477.56) 16,387.22 (2,473.14) 
Percent Urban .29 (.21) .29 (.21) .33 (.22) .33 (.22) 
Percent Poverty .18 (.07) .18 (.07) .15 (.06) .15 (.06) 
Percent Unemployment .07 (.03) .07 (.03) .06 (.02) .06 (.02) 
Percent Employment Growth .10 (.15) .10 (.15) .14 (.13) .14 (.13) 
Percent Out-Commuting .28 (.13) .28 (.12) .34 (.13) .34 (.13) 
Percent High School Graduate .66 (.09) .66 (.09) .75 (.08) .75 (.08) 
Percent Dependent .43 (.03) .43 (.03) .41 (.03) .41 (.03) 
Percent White .86 (.16) .86 (.16) .84 (.17) .84 (.17) 
Percent Old Housing .42 (.13) .42 (.13) .37 (.14) .37 (.14) 
Gini Coefficient .43 (.04) .43 (.04) .44 (.04) .44 (.04) 
N 985 926 1,027 1,034 
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Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) 
Nonmetropolitan Adjacent U.S. County Areas; N = 985 (1987), 926 (1992), 1,027 (1997), 1,034 (2002) 
Nonmetropolitan Adjacent counties have the following Rural-Urban Continuum Codes: 4, 6, 8; U.S.D.A. Economic Research 
Service (1993, 2003) 
Source: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Metropolitan County Areas 
U.S. Census of Population and Housing Variables 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Population 241,528.77 (532,737.78) 246,239.66 (537,468.24) 220,075.69 (526,989.59) 218,582.67 (525,253.60) 
Percent Population Growth .15 (.20) .15 (.21) .18 (.18) .18 (.18) 
Population Density 497.56 (1,411.12) 506.94 (1,424.79) 437.37 (1,338.30) 435.04 (1,333.51) 
Population Density Squared 2,236,356.50 (23,375,775.64) 
2,284,428.38 
(23,624,258.28) 
1,980,621.18 
(24,751,524.93) 
1,965,803.46 
(24,657,362.04) 
Per Capita Income ($) 17,809.33 (3,954.97) 17,846.70 (3,960.23) 19,973.18 (4,373.55) 19,966.78 (4,376.40) 
Percent Urban .62 (.27) .63 (.27) .58 (.31) .58 (.31) 
Percent Poverty .12 (.06) .12 (.06) .11 (.05) .11 (.05) 
Percent Unemployment .06 (.02) .06 (.02) .05 (.02) .05 (.02) 
Percent Employment Growth .26 (.25) .26 (.25) .21 (.19) .21 (.19) 
Percent Out-Commuting .34 (.21) .34 (.20) .40 (.21) .40 (.21) 
Percent High School Graduate .75 (.08) .75 (.08) .80 (.08) .80 (.08) 
Percent Dependent .38 (.03) .38 (.03) .38 (.03) .38 (.03) 
Percent White .87 (.12) .86 (.12) .83 (.14) .83 (.15) 
Percent Old Housing .37 (.15) .37 (.15) .31 (.15) .31 (.15) 
Gini Coefficient .41 (.04) .41 (.04) .43 (.04) .43 (.04) 
N 806 789 1,040 1,048 
Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) 
Metropolitan U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington, D.C.; N = 806 (1987), 789 (1992), 1,040 (1997), 
1,048 (2002) 
Metropolitan counties have the following Rural-Urban Continuum Codes: 0, 1, 2, 3 (1993); 1, 2, 3 (2003); U.S.D.A. Economic 
Research Service 
Source: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000) 
Dollar values in constant dollars, 2000=100
published decennially whereas the U.S. Census of Governments is published 
quinquennially.  Therefore, the cross-sectional regression models utilize the Census of 
Population data for the nearest year: the 1987 and 1992 models use the data for 1990, 
and the 1997 and 2002 models use the 2000 data.  It should be noted that the Census 
of Population data used is not different between 1987 and 1992 or between 1997 and 
2002, but some of the descriptive statistics show slight changes, reflecting a different 
sample size for each model year 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. 
Redistribution 
To test for the redistributive effects of federal aid, state aid, and local effort, 
the following variables are included in the regression models: percent poverty, percent 
unemployment, percent dependent, percent white, and percent old housing.  The 
county poverty level is an important determinant of need and a measure of 
redistribution.  The national percent poverty decreased from 17 percent in 1987 to 14 
percent in 2002 (Table 6).  Both nonmetropolitan and metropolitan counties follow the 
same national trend; however, percent poverty decreased from 18 percent to 16 
percent for rural areas, and from 12 percent to 11 percent for urban areas, confirming 
higher and lower poverty in these two respective areas (Tables 7 and 10).  Percent 
poverty is the highest in nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties where it dropped from 
19 percent in 1987 to 16 percent in 2002 (Table 8).  It lowered from 18 percent to 15 
percent in nonmetropolitan adjacent counties (Table 9).  For percent unemployment, 
the trends for the nation and for rural counties are identical: percent unemployment 
decreased from 7 percent in 1987 to 6 percent in 2002 (Tables 6 and 7).  Urban areas 
have a slightly lower percent unemployment illustrated by the decrease from 6 percent 
in 1987 to 5 percent in 2002 (Table 10). 
Young and old dependents require more government services and contribute 
less to the local economy than the working-age population, making the funding of 
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public services more difficult.  The percent dependent variable represents persons 
younger than 18 and older than 64.  The national percent dependent dropped from 42
percent in 1987 to 40 percent in 2002 (Table 6).  Percent dependent declined from 43 
percent to 41 percent for rural areas, but remained constant at 38 percent for urban 
areas (Tables 7 and 10).  Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties have the highest 
percent dependent and saw a decrease from 44 percent in 1987 to 42 percent in 2002 
(Table 8).  Percent dependent also fell in nonmetropolitan adjacent counties from 43 
percent to 41 percent (Table 9). 
Counties with a lower percent white population also have a higher need for aid 
due to the history of racial discrimination and oppression in the U.S.  The racial trends 
for the nation and for rural counties are approximately the same: the percent white 
decreased from 88 percent in 1987 to 85 percent in 2002 for the nation, and from 88 
percent to 86 percent in rural areas (Tables 6 and 7).  Urban areas have the smallest 
percent white population reflected in the decline from 87 percent in 1987 to 83 percent 
in 2002 (Table 10).  Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties have the highest percent 
white which fell from 90 percent in 1987 to 88 percent in 2002 (Table 8).  It dropped 
from 86 percent to 84 percent in nonmetropolitan adjacent counties (Table 9).  Thus, 
racial minorities are growing as a percent of the population in both rural and urban 
areas, but they tend to be more highly concentrated in urban counties. 
An older housing stock indicates that the public infrastructure, including water 
and sewers, is older and more costly to maintain and replace.  The variable for percent 
old housing is measured as the percentage of housing built before 1960.  The national 
percent old housing decreased from 41 percent in 1987 to 36 percent in 2002 (Table 
6).  Nonmetropolitan and metropolitan counties follow the same national trend, 
although percent old housing declined more modestly from 41 percent in 1987 to 39 
percent in 2002 in rural areas, and from 37 percent to 31 percent in urban areas, 
reflecting more new development in metropolitan areas over this period (Tables 7 and 
10).  Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties have the highest percent old housing, 
which dropped from 46 percent in 1987 to 42 percent in 2002 (Table 8).  It fell from 
42 percent to 37 percent in nonmetropolitan adjacent counties (Table 9).  Percent 
white is the only redistributive variable for which urban counties are more 
disadvantaged in comparison to rural counties.  The variables percent poverty, percent 
unemployment, percent dependent, and percent old housing all disadvantage rural 
areas more than urban areas.  If federal and state aid are redistributive towards these 
variables, the sign will be positive for all of them except for percent white, which 
should be negative. 
Development 
To test for the developmental effects of federal aid, state aid, and local effort, 
the following variables are included in the regression models: percent population 
growth, percent employment growth, and percent high school graduate.  The variable 
for percent population growth captures in-migration and economic growth.  Percent 
population growth increased for all counties from 4 percent in 1987 to 11 percent in 
2002 (Table 6).  Nonmetropolitan and metropolitan counties follow the same national 
trend, but percent population growth increased from less than 1 percent in 1987 to 8 
percent in 2002 in rural areas, and from 15 percent in 1987 to 18 percent in 2002 in 
urban areas, confirming lower and higher percent population growth in these two 
respective areas (Tables 7 and 10).  Percent population growth is the lowest in 
nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties, where increased from negative 3 percent in 
1987 to 5 percent in 2002 (Table 8).  It grew from 3 percent to 10 percent in 
nonmetropolitan adjacent counties (Table 9). 
Percent employment growth is a developmental measure that represents the 
creation of new jobs and a strong local economy.  This variable increased for all 
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counties from 13 percent in 1987 to 15 percent in 2002, and for rural counties from 8 
percent to 12 percent (Tables 6 and 7).  Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties have 
the lowest percent employment growth but the highest rate of increase, which grew 
from 3 percent in 1987 to 10 percent in 2002 (Table 8).  It rose from 10 percent to 14 
percent in nonmetropolitan adjacent counties (Table 9).  Percent employment growth 
decreased for urban counties from 26 percent in 1987 to 21 percent in 2002 (Table 
10).  Even though percent employment growth declined for metropolitan counties, 
their average is still well above the national and rural average. 
The percent high school graduate variable is included because a county 
characterized by higher educational attainment will generally have a more skilled 
labor force with better job prospects.  For all counties, the percent high school 
graduate increased from 70 percent in 1987 to 77 percent in 2002 (Table 6).  
Nonmetropolitan and metropolitan counties follow the same national trend, yet percent 
high school graduate increased more in rural areas from 68 percent in 1987 to 76 
percent in 2002, than in urban areas which saw an increase from 75 percent in 1987 to 
80 percent in 2002, though the rate is still higher in urban areas (Tables 7 and 10).  
Nonmetropolitan adjacent counties have the lowest percent high school graduate 
which rose from 66 percent in 1987 to 75 percent in 2002 (Table 9).  It grew from 69 
to 77 in nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties (Table 8).  The developmental 
variables of percent population growth, percent employment growth, and percent high 
school graduate favor urban counties over rural counties.  If federal and state aid are 
developmental with respect to these variables, the sign will be positive for each of 
them. 
Spatial Effects 
To capture the spatial distribution of federal aid, state aid, and local effort, the 
following variables are included in the regression models: nonmetropolitan 
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nonadjacent, nonmetropolitan federal land, percent urban, and percent out-commuting.  
The models include the following rural variables coded as dummy variables: 
nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties from the Rural-Urban Continuum Codes 
(U.S.D.A Economic Research Service 1993, 2003) and nonmetropolitan federal land 
counties from the County Typology Codes (U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service 
1989).  The U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service published the County Typology 
Codes in 1989 to identify eleven types of nonmetropolitan counties according to either 
their primary economic activity or other themes of special policy significance.  The 
typology includes six economic types and five policy types.  When the County 
Typology Codes were updated in 2004, the federal land policy type was removed.  
Therefore, this study utilizes the County Typology Codes for 1989. 
In nonmetropolitan areas, costs are higher for counties not adjacent to a city 
because they cannot benefit from tax exporting or service spillovers from neighboring 
urban counties (Warner and Pratt 2005; Warner 2001).  Without the buffer of 
redistributive aid from federal sources, nonadjacent rural places may find it 
increasingly difficult to take on important responsibilities implicit with devolution 
(Warner 1999).  76 percent of federal land counties are located in the Western states 
and at least thirty percent of the county’s land area is federally-owned land.  The 
functions of these counties are primarily for recreational use and land management.  
This variable is included because federal land counties have a smaller land area to 
collect property taxes from due to the presence of federally-owned land.  Most federal 
land counties are concentrated in nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties (Table 3). 
Percent urban indicates a greater demand for public services and higher costs 
of service delivery resulting from congestion.  This variable increased for all counties 
from 36 percent in 1987 to 40 percent in 2002, and for nonmetropolitan counties from 
26 percent in 1987 to 30 percent in 2002 (Tables 6 and 7).  Nonmetropolitan 
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nonadjacent counties have the lowest percent urban which rose from 25 percent in 
1987 to 28 percent in 2002 (Table 8).  It grew from 29 percent to 33 percent in 
nonmetropolitan adjacent counties (Table 9).  Percent urban decreased in metropolitan 
counties from 62 percent in 1987 to 58 percent in 2002 reflecting urban sprawl (Table 
10).  The expected sign for this variable is positive for a redistributive effect of 
intergovernmental aid. 
To capture the effect of nonresidents and tax exporting, a percent out-
commuting variable is included.  Tax exporting is the ability to shift the tax burden to 
nonresidents through commuting, sales, and income taxes.  Counties with a higher 
proportion of workers out-commuting benefit from the public service spillovers of 
nearby communities and they do not have to deal with the costly peak load problems 
that local employment centers experience.  Peak load problems refer to the 
substantially higher number of people that must be served during peak business hours 
than during nonpeak, non-business hours.  Counties with higher percentages of 
residents out-commuting benefit from reduced costs since those residents will not 
require the county’s local government services while they are working outside the 
county.  Due to the lower service costs, the expected sign for this variable is negative 
for the federal and state aid models, and positive for the local effort models. 
Unfortunately, the U.S. Census of Population does not include a measurement 
of in-commuting which would provide a more direct measure of tax exporting.  
Ignoring in-commuting can result in overstating the cost advantages of out-
commuting.  Percent out-commuting increased in all counties from 28 percent in 1987 
to 33 percent in 2002 (Table 6).  The variable also rose in nonmetropolitan counties 
from 25 percent in 1987 to 29 percent in 2002 and in metropolitan counties from 34 
percent to 40 percent (Tables 7 and 10).  Percent out-commuting is the lowest in 
nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties, where it grew from 19 percent in 1987 to 24 
 48
percent in 2002 (Table 8), because these workers have the farthest commuting distance 
to travel.  It increased in nonmetropolitan adjacent counties from 28 percent to 34 
percent (Table 9). 
Economies of Scale 
To test the response of federal aid, state aid, and local effort to economies of 
scale, the following variables are included in the regression models: population, 
population density, and population density squared.  Population increased for all 
counties from 80,007 in 1987 to 91,887 in 2002 (Table 6).  Population also increased 
in rural counties from 22,223 in 1987 to 24,351 in 2002, and from 241,529 in 1987 to 
218,583 in 2002 in urban counties (Tables 7 and 10).  Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent 
counties have the smallest population which grew from 15,790 in 1987 to 17,144 in 
2002 (Table 8).  It rose from 28,837 to 32,020 in nonmetropolitan adjacent counties 
(Table 9). 
The population variable does not reflect higher public service costs at both 
ends of the population density spectrum.  Theory and prior empirical analysis suggest 
a U-shaped cost curve in which service costs are higher for rural areas with low 
density (the cost of sparsity) and for urban areas with high density (the cost of 
congestion) (Reeder and Jansen 1995).  The U-shaped curve implies that costs per 
capita decline up to a minimum-cost point, after which they begin to rise.  There are 
economies of scale in the provision of public services, meaning that the per capita 
costs of providing public services fall as a place’s population size and density rise and 
as it becomes more urban in character.  Rural counties with smaller population 
densities are expected to experience diseconomies of scale resulting in higher per 
capita costs of public services.  Urban counties with larger population densities are 
expected to benefit from economies of scale that reduce the per capita cost of 
providing public services, although it is possible costs may rise due to congestion for 
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the largest cities.  Government poor counties face higher costs of providing public 
services due to smaller percentages of urban population, smaller populations and 
population densities, and diseconomies of providing services in such lightly populated 
places (Reeder and Jansen 1995). 
Because the U-shaped cost curve is nonlinear, a squared version of population 
density is included in the models.  However, the regression models used for this study 
analyze government revenue, not costs.  The quadratic form of the curve is expected to 
show increasing economies of scale as population rises and the benefits of 
urbanization are realized, until the point of congestion is reached and decreasing 
economies of scale become evident.  The variables for population density and 
population density squared are measured as population per square mile.  Population 
density increased in all counties from 158 persons per square mile in 1987 to 177 
persons per square mile in 2002 (Table 6).  Population density grew in 
nonmetropolitan counties from 36 persons per square mile in 1987 to 39 persons per 
square mile in 2002, but decreased in metropolitan counties from 498 persons per 
square mile to 435 persons per square mile (Tables 7 and 10).  Nonmetropolitan 
nonadjacent counties have the lowest population density which rose from 25 persons 
per square mile in 1987 to 27 persons per square mile in 2002 (Table 8).  It grew from 
47 persons per square mile to 51 persons per square mile in nonmetropolitan adjacent 
counties (Table 9).  Population density is more than ten times higher in urban areas 
than in rural areas. 
Local Capacity 
Per capita income measures local economic well-being and the fiscal capacity 
to raise revenues.  Lower per capita income indicates a greater dependence on the 
public sector for basic goods and services.  Per capita income increased in all counties 
from $14,610.53 in 1987 to $17,473.95 in 2002 (Table 6).  It also rose in 
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nonmetropolitan counties from $13,466.17 in 1987 to $16,145.11 in 2002 and in 
metropolitan areas from $17,809.33 in 1987 to $19,966.78 in 2002 (Tables 7 and 10).  
Per capita income is the lowest in nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties which grew 
from $13,222.62 in 1987 to $16,008.88 in 2002 (Table 8).  It increased from 
$13,735.21 to $16,387.22 in nonmetropolitan adjacent counties (Table 9).  If federal 
and state aid are redistributive toward per capita income, the sign will be negative.  If 
they are developmental, the sign will be positive. 
Income Homogeneity 
The local effort model includes a variable to measure income inequality, the 
Gini coefficient.  Theory predicts that effort will be higher in places with more 
homogeneous income distributions because all residents use the services paid for by 
tax dollars and benefit equally.  The service to benefit ratio, which is calculated as the 
value of a service to its tax cost, is primarily less than one for the higher income 
taxpayer and greater than one for the lower income taxpayer.  In areas with greater 
income inequality, wealthier residents generally prefer not to pay taxes for services 
that mainly benefit poorer residents (Schneider 1989).  Thus, counties with higher 
Gini coefficients are expected to have lower effort.  The Gini coefficient for all 
counties increased slightly from .42 in 1987 to .43 in 2002 (Table 6).  It also increased 
in nonmetropolitan counties from .43 to .44 and in metropolitan counties from .41 to 
.43, showing that rural areas have higher income inequality than urban areas (Tables 7 
and 10). 
State Policy 
State centralization measures the degree of centralization in fiscal 
responsibility for governmental services.  It has the potential to relieve local 
governments of responsibilities they formerly held, thereby reducing their cost of 
providing services.  Significant variation exists among states in the share of local 
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services paid for by state governments.  Such variation is a major cause of differences 
in the local tax burden.  State centralization can be either a complement or a substitute 
for the three dependent variables federal aid, state aid, and local effort.  If it is a 
complement, then counties with a higher mean of the dependent variable will also 
have higher state centralization.  If state centralization is a substitute, then counties 
with a higher mean federal aid, state aid, or local effort will have lower state 
centralization. 
The state centralization variable is calculated as the ratio of state direct general 
expenditures to state and local direct general expenditures.  Although this variable is 
continuous, running a regression model with state centralization as a continuous 
variable produces forty-seven coefficients, and requires the selection of a reference 
state.  This study does not intend to discuss each state individually, but rather states 
grouped by their level of centralization.  Therefore, a nominal state centralization 
variable was created by dividing the states into three groups: low, medium, and high 
centralization.  Medium is the reference group, with the low and high groups outside 
of one standard deviation from the mean for the corresponding year.  The nominal 
state centralization variable is run as a fixed effect for all versions of the model. 
Table 11 displays the average state centralization for states categorized as 
either low or high centralization for all four model years.  States that do not fall 
outside of one standard deviation of the mean state centralization for all four years are 
excluded from the low and high categories in Table 11.  Five states are categorized 
low state centralization for all four years, nine states as high state centralization, and 
the remaining thirty-four states as medium state centralization.  The average state 
centralization for the lower forty-eight states has risen from .45 in 1987 to .48 in 2002.  
Furthermore, state centralization rose for all states categorized as low or high 
centralization, except for Nevada which is a low centralization state and decreased
Table 11: Average State Centralization 1987-2002 
 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Low States     
California .3292 .3275 .3351 .3547 
Colorado .3364 .3527 .3644 .3856 
Florida .3063 .3511 .3588 .3818 
Nevada .3437 .3479 .3231 .3237 
New York .3425 .3537 .3541 .3571 
High States     
Connecticut .5055 .5222 .5327 .5703 
Delaware .6065 .6321 .6399 .6365 
Kentucky .5438 .5724 .5592 .5928 
Maine .5319 .5424 .5522 .5864 
North Dakota .5634 .5772 .5603 .5731 
Rhode Island .5974 .6437 .5894 .6059 
South Carolina .4992 .5210 .5122 .5377 
Vermont .5950 .5970 .5986 .6234 
West Virginia .5385 .5576 .5776 .6186 
All States .4476 .4700 .4649 .4807 
U.S. States excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington, D.C.; N = 48 
Source: U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002) 
State Centralization = state share of direct general expenditures by state and local 
government 
Low and high groups are outside of one standard deviation from mean for 
corresponding year 
Excludes states not in low or high groups for all four years
 
slightly from .34 in 1987 to .32 in 2002 (Table 11).  Table 1 presents state 
centralization data for counties, not states.  The average state centralization has risen 
for all counties regardless of their location in a state categorized as low, medium, or 
high centralization.  From 1987 to 2002, state centralization increased from .34 to .37 
in low states, .43 to .45 in medium states, and .54 to .58 in high states (Table 1).  This 
data illustrates the trend of centralization within decentralization and the increasing 
importance of the state. 
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Figure 8: Average State Aid and State Centralization 1987-2002 
U.S. States excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington, D.C.; N = 48 
Source: U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002) 
State Centralization = state share of direct general expenditures by state and local 
government 
Grid lines at state average for 1987-2002 
Average state aid per capita in constant dollars, 2000=100 
 
While both state centralization and state aid have been rising, they are 
negatively correlated with each other.  States tend to be high in either centralization or 
state aid, but not both.  Figure 8 is a graph of the average state aid to counties within 
each state and the average state centralization for the forty-eight contiguous states 
across the 1987-2002 period studied.  The graph grid lines are located at the average 
value for each variable.  Between 1987 and 2002, the average state centralization is 
.47 and the average state aid per capita is $978.01 in constant 2000 dollars.  Most 
states are concentrated in top-left quadrant (high state aid – low state centralization) 
and bottom-right quadrant (low state aid – high state centralization) of the graph.  
Many of the states located in the bottom-right quadrant (low state aid – high state 
centralization) are smaller states where it is easier to administer programs at the state 
level.  The largest, most heterogeneous states in the in top-left quadrant (high state aid 
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– low state centralization) such as California and New York provide more state aid so 
that counties can administer programs. 
Typically, states giving higher state aid have lower state centralization, and 
states with higher centralization give less state aid.  The regression line fitted through 
the data verifies this relationship by passing through top-left and bottom-right graph 
quadrants.  Three outlier states (New Mexico, Utah, and Delaware) are located in top 
right quadrant (high state aid – high state centralization).  Many states are located in 
the bottom left quadrant (low state aid – low state centralization).  Since so little aid is 
received from the state, these county governments must rely more heavily on locally 
raised revenue.  Wealthier counties can make up the difference with higher effort but 
poorer counties are less able to increase effort to meet these needs.  This stratification 
leads to increasing spatial inequality as counties are caught in virtuous and vicious 
cycles. 
Modeling Techniques 
The analysis is interested in how counties are affected by state policy regarding 
local intergovernmental aid and state centralization of fiscal responsibility.  Although 
county areas are the unit of analysis, county-level processes are influenced by higher 
government units, in this case, the state.  As a result, the dataset has an unbalanced 
nested structure, with counties nested in states where the number of counties differs by 
state.  Data of this type are amenable to estimation methods that correct for state 
heterogeneity bias: the confounding effects of unmeasured state-level variables that 
are county-invariant within a state and omitted from the regression model.  
Heterogeneity bias can affect the independence of the error term and the ordinary least 
squares coefficient estimates (Nielsen and Alderson 1997).  The value of a national 
model is to look at differences across counties and between states.  Although state 
authorities may not concern themselves with the need, capacity, or fiscal effort of 
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jurisdictions in other states, competitive benchmarking between states and between 
metropolitan regions across states has increased over time. 
Warner (2001) controlled for heterogeneity by state using weighted least 
squares modeling with state weights and found important differences in models testing 
the redistributive or developmental effects of state aid.  Another option is to model the 
state-specific intercepts as either fixed or random effects (Lobao and Hooks 2003).  
The fixed effect model and random effect model are commonly used estimation 
strategies that correct for unmeasured county-invariant factors.  Both methods address 
the state heterogeneity problem by simulating the unmeasured county-invariant factors 
as state-specific intercepts (Nielsen and Alderson 1997).  The fixed effect model treats 
the state-specific intercepts as equivalent to regression coefficients of indicator 
variables for each state.  In contrast, the random effect model treats the state-specific 
intercepts as a random component of the error term (Lobao and Hooks 2003). 
This study implements fixed effects modeling for four reasons.  The first 
reason is to correct the problem of state heterogeneity previously discussed.  Second, 
random effects are more appropriate for studies involving a random sample of data 
from a larger population.  From the random sample of cases included in the data, 
inferences are then made about the population.  On the other hand, when inferences 
are confined to the effects in the sample only, then the effects are more appropriately 
considered fixed (Hsiao 1986:43).  Inter-county comparisons may well include the full 
set of counties for which it is reasonable to assume the model is constant (Greene 
1990:485).  Since this study includes all contiguous counties in the U.S. for which 
data are available, it does not employ a random sample of counties from a larger 
population.  Inferences cannot be made that apply to a larger population of counties, 
since such a population does not exist outside of the dataset.  Alaska, Hawaii, 
Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone National Park were deliberately excluded from 
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the sample due to extreme values.  Any other counties not included in the sample had 
missing data.  Therefore, the dataset is not a random sample from a larger population. 
Third, the random effects model has been criticized for neglecting the 
correlation that may exist between the effects and the explanatory variables, which can 
lead to biased and inconsistent estimation (Hsiao 1986:43).  The random effects model 
may suffer from this inconsistency due to omitted variables (Greene 1990:495).  
Government policy-related variables are included in the models, so the covariates are 
not independent of the state.  Because of the focus on the impact of state policy on 
county government, state-fixed effects are important to control for variations between 
policy regimes across states.  This analysis therefore follows the technique of Lobao 
and Hooks (2003) who modeled the state-specific intercepts as fixed effects using the 
state centralization variable. 
Quantitative models of cross-sectional data face the challenge that units may 
be more heterogeneous across space than through time.  The use of any spatial unit, 
such as counties or states, raises questions about spatial autocorrelation.  Spatial 
autocorrelation is the extent to which counties are interdependent or a function of 
conditions that result from proximity to other counties.  Its occurrence can produce 
inefficient and biased estimates unless adjustments are made.  For instance, when 
values are correlated geographically, the statistical assumption of independence is 
violated.  One source of spatial autocorrelation is measurement error whereby data are 
aggregated and miscalculations in one spatial unit spillover to neighboring units.  This 
problem is especially a risk for U.S. Census of Governments data aggregated at the 
county area level.  Another cause is interdependence in space where high values in one 
unit are associated with low values in another unit creating a checkerboard pattern 
(negative autocorrelation), like values cluster together creating a lattice effect (positive 
autocorrelation), or values follow a gradient of diffusion. 
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To correct the problem of spatial autocorrelation, national studies of counties 
typically use either state-fixed effects or a spatial autocorrelation control variable, but 
not both.  Empirically, a state variable and a spatial autocorrelation control variable 
cannot be jointly included in a model because they create severe collinearity.  Both are 
redundant to a degree, since most counties are closest in proximity to others in their 
same state (Lobao and Hooks 2003).  One problem with a spatial autocorrelation 
control variable is that it requires the researcher to stipulate, a priori, the nature of the 
spatial relation (Warner and Pratt 2005).  This is the fourth reason why fixed effect 
modeling is used for this study.  To address the impact of broader state policy 
variables, Warner and Pratt (2005) demonstrated how the use of Knowledge in Data 
Discovery techniques such as neural networks and classification trees can disentangle 
spatial effects and look specifically at differences in state policy and its impacts on 
localities.  State centralization was found to be the most important variable 
differentiating effects across county areas. 
Review of the strengths and weaknesses of methods pursued by other 
researchers suggests that a fixed effect cross-sectional and generalized estimation 
modeling approach is most appropriate for this study.  The results will produce 
valuable new knowledge of the impacts of fiscal devolution at four recent cross-
sections in time covering a fifteen year period.  The prior empirical analyses are 
updated with the most current data.  The descriptive statistics suggest that 
nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties have the highest local effort and are in the most 
need of redistributive aid based on their demographic characteristics.  Furthermore, 
local effort is countercyclical since it is higher during recessions.  But the descriptive 
analysis does not indicate how federal and state aid are combining redistributive and 
developmental aspects.  Therefore, multivariate regression modeling is necessary to 
answer the research question: Are federal aid, state aid, and local government revenue 
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effort redistributive, developmental, or both?  The models will show if the findings 
indicated by the descriptive statistics are statistically significant when other variables 
are controlled. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS 
Outline 
This chapter provides an analysis of the regression modeling results.  The 
chapter begins with the model results for the federal aid, state aid, and local effort 
models.  This section is followed by a discussion of the redistributive and 
developmental aspects of the three dependent variables.  In conclusion, the wider 
theoretical and policy implications of the study are discussed. 
Modeling Results 
Table 12 presents the federal aid regression modeling results.  This model 
performed more poorly than the state aid and local effort models, with the lowest R 
squared values ranging from 0.148 to 0.296.  The per capita dollar amount of federal 
aid is so small that in reality, it has very little impact on local government revenue and 
thus is difficult to model.  The year variable is negative, suggesting a decreasing trend 
for federal aid over 1987-2002.  Federal aid is a complement to local effort (+) except 
in 2002 and to state aid (+), which is a developmental effect.  Federal aid has become 
more of a complement to state aid through the years as shown by the positive 
interaction between year and state aid.  Counties in low state centralization states 
received more federal aid (+) in 1987 than medium state centralization states.  
Counties in states with high centralization also received more federal aid (+) in 1987, 
1997, and the GEM than medium state centralization states.  Based on these results, 
federal aid is not a clear substitute or complement to state centralization.  However, 
federal aid is developmental since it is higher for counties in high centralization states. 
Federal aid is redistributive toward percent poverty (+) in 1992 and 2002, 
percent unemployment (+), and percent white (-).  Federal aid is not redistributive 
with respect to percent dependent which is negative in 1992, or to percent old housing
Table 12: Federal Aid Regression Modeling Results 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 GEM 
Intercept 3.888* -0.399 -3.205 -4.760* 0.072 
Low State Centralization 0.096* -0.093 0.052 0.061 -0.025 
High State Centralization 0.113** -0.057 0.167** 0.075 0.149*** 
State Aid Per Capita 0.262*** 0.464*** 0.572*** 0.473*** 2E-04*** 
Local Effort Per Capita  0.233*** 0.334*** 0.271*** 0.093 0.679** 
Nonmetro Nonadjacent 0.019 -0.027 0.055 0.012 -0.015 
Nonmetro Federal Land 0.410*** 0.749*** 0.510*** 0.543*** 0.267*** 
Ln Population 0.115*** 0.132*** 0.058 0.079* -0.105*** 
Percent Population Growth -0.831** -0.026 -0.114 -1.141** -0.121 
Population Density 2E-04*** 2E-04** 1E-04* 2E-04** 4E-04*** 
Population Density Squared -9E-09*** -1E-08* -5E-09 -6E-09 -1E-08*** 
Ln Per Capita Income -0.321* -0.010 0.279 0.450* -0.004 
Percent Urban -0.137 -0.047 0.149 0.086 -0.148** 
Percent Poverty 0.200 1.816* 1.317 2.119** 0.549 
Percent Unemployment 4.736*** 5.340*** 2.911* 5.966*** 5.697*** 
Percent Employment Growth 0.233 -0.121 -0.079 0.574 -0.055 
Percent Out-Commuting -1.173*** -1.593*** -1.309*** -1.558*** -1.016*** 
Percent High School Graduate 2.160*** 2.372*** 1.798*** 1.773*** 2.555*** 
Percent Dependent 0.040 -2.154** -0.625 -0.292 0.171 
Percent White -0.682*** -1.032*** -1.200*** -1.351*** -1.047*** 
Percent Old Housing -0.311 0.239 0.264 0.013 -0.327** 
Year     -0.042*** 
Year * State Aid Centered     9E-05*** 
N 3,059 2,876 2,990 3,014 11,939 
R Squared 0.296 0.207 0.214 0.250 0.148 
*** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05 
Values are unstandardized coefficients: natural log units for cross sectional models 
and centered units divided by 100 for GEM 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Sources: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000); U.S. Census of Governments 
(1987, 1992, 1997, 2002); U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service (1989, 1993, 2003)
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Figure 9: Federal Aid Density Curve 1987-2002 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Sources: U.S. Census of Population (1990, 2000); U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 
1992, 1997, 2002) 
Based on GEM regression results 
 
which is negative for the GEM.  Population is positive (+) except in 1997 
(insignificant) and the GEM (-).  Federal aid is positive for population density (+) and 
negative for population density squared (-) except in 1997 and 2002.  Figure 9 shows 
that the federal aid curve is upward sloping as population density increases except for 
New York City, which has the highest density in the sample and represents the two 
data points near the 25,000 persons per square mile density mark.  The density of New 
York City is slightly under 25,000 in 1990 and grew to just above 25,000 in 2000.  
The inverted U-shape of the graph reflects the federal aid response to the measure for 
economies of scale.  Federal aid initially rises at a faster rate for counties with a 
smaller density under 5,000 persons per square mile, and then rises at a slower rate for 
counties with a higher density between 5,000 and 15,000 persons per square mile. 
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Federal aid is developmental with respect to per capita income (+) in 2002 and 
percent high school graduate (+).  Federal aid is not developmental toward percent 
population growth which is negative in 1987 and 2002, or percent employment growth 
which is insignificant.  Per capita income reversed sign from negative in 1987 to 
positive in 2002.  This result demonstrates the trend over time toward a more pro-
growth focus of the federal government.  Spatially, federal aid is higher for federal 
land counties (+), lower for urban counties (-) according to the GEM and for counties 
with a higher percent out-commuting (-), and insignificant for nonmetropolitan 
nonadjacent counties. 
Table 13 displays the state aid regression results.  This model performed better 
than the federal aid models but not as well as the local effort models, with the R 
squared values ranging between 0.217 and 0.346.  The year variable is positive, 
confirming that state aid has steadily increased over the period studied.  State aid is a 
complement to federal aid (+).  State aid is a substitute for local effort (-) in 1987 but 
changes to a complement (+) in 2002.  State aid is a substitute (-) for the GEM; 
however, it has become less of a substitute for local effort during the time-span, as 
demonstrated by the positive interaction between year and local effort.  This finding 
illustrates the trend over time toward a more pro-growth focus of the state.  As shown 
in Figure 10, state aid is a substitute for state centralization: counties in states with 
high centralization (-) receive less state aid than medium state centralization states 
except in 2002, and counties in states with low centralization (+) receive more state 
aid than medium centralization states.  This relationship is expected since other 
researchers have come to the same conclusion.  The positive interaction between year 
and low state centralization indicates that these counties are gradually receiving more 
state aid over the timeframe. 
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Table 13: State Aid Regression Modeling Results 
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 GEM 
Intercept 8.259*** 8.487*** 9.476*** 8.773*** 0.665* 
Low State Centralization 0.272*** 0.332*** 0.337*** 0.275*** 0.290*** 
High State Centralization -0.088*** -0.076*** -0.126*** -0.030 -.077*** 
Federal Aid Per Capita 0.059*** 0.026*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 3E-04*** 
Local Effort Per Capita -0.045** 0.001 -0.017 0.048** -0.274** 
Nonmetro Nonadjacent 0.020 0.001 -0.002 0.008 -0.001 
Nonmetro Federal Land 0.258*** 0.218*** 0.179*** 0.169*** 0.209*** 
Ln Population 0.068*** 0.032*** 0.015 0.053*** 0.004 
Percent Population Growth -0.694*** -0.340** -0.581*** -0.237* -0.450*** 
Population Density -7E-06 -1E-05 2E-05 -2E-05 2E-05 
Population Density Squared 1E-09 2E-09 -2E-10 1E-09 6E-10 
Ln Per Capita Income -0.303*** -0.253*** -0.328*** -0.268*** -0.123*** 
Percent Urban -0.254*** -0.170*** -0.175*** -0.237*** -0.182*** 
Percent Poverty -0.471* -0.258 -0.805*** -1.054*** -0.643*** 
Percent Unemployment 1.891*** 1.994*** 3.334*** 3.734*** 3.263*** 
Percent Employment Growth 0.397*** 0.342*** 0.289*** 0.145 0.370*** 
Percent Out-Commuting 0.037 -0.038 0.008 0.107* -0.090*** 
Percent High School Graduate -0.087 -0.101 -0.202 -0.115 0.023 
Percent Dependent 0.333 0.507** 0.534** 0.550** 0.345*** 
Percent White -0.273*** -0.246*** -0.070 -0.157** -0.232*** 
Percent Old Housing 0.566*** 0.532*** 0.547*** 0.532*** 0.484*** 
Year         0.173*** 
Year * Low State Centralization     0.049*** 
Year * Local Effort Centered     0.209*** 
Year * Percent Employment Growth     -0.035* 
N 3,059 2,876 2,990 3,014 11,939 
R Squared 0.217 0.281 0.337 0.237 0.346 
*** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05 
Values are unstandardized coefficients: natural log units for cross sectional models 
and centered units divided by 1,000 for GEM 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Sources: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000); U.S. Census of Governments 
(1987, 1992, 1997, 2002); U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service (1989, 1993, 2003)
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Figure 10: State Aid and State Centralization Substitution Effect 1987-2002 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Source: U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002) 
Based on GEM regression results 
 
State aid is redistributive with respect to per capita income (-), percent 
unemployment (+), percent dependent (+) except in 1987, percent white (-) except in 
1997, and percent old housing (+).  State aid is not redistributive toward percent 
poverty which is negative (-) except in 1992.  State aid is higher (+) in places with a 
larger population except in 1997 and the GEM, suggesting that the state rewards the 
lower costs in more populous counties due to benefits from economies of scale.  
However, population density and density squared are insignificant.  State aid is 
developmental toward percent employment growth (+) except in 2002.  State aid is not 
developmental with respect to percent population growth (-) or percent high school 
graduate (insignificant).  The negative interaction between year and percent 
employment growth demonstrates that state aid is less developmental toward counties 
experiencing employment growth over the period studied, confirming the 2002 result.  
In regards to spatial effects, state aid is higher for federal land counties (+), lower for 
 65
percent urban (-) and counties with a higher percent out-commuting (-) for the GEM, 
and insignificant for nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties. 
Table 14 shows the regression results for local effort.  This model performed 
better than the federal and state aid models, with the highest R squared values ranging 
from 0.280 to 0.468.  Although none of the models run by this study were able to 
explain over half of the variance in the dependent variable, the purpose of much social 
science modeling is to learn more about relationships between variables, rather than to 
determine direct cause and effect relationships.  The year variable is insignificant since 
local effort is countercyclical and does not show a uniformly positive or negative trend 
throughout 1987-2002.  Local effort is a complement to federal aid (+) except in 2002 
and to state aid (+) in 2002.  The negative interaction between year and federal aid 
suggests that local effort is less of a complement to federal aid over the period studied.  
State aid changed from a substitute (-) in 1987 and 1997 to a complement (+) in 2002.  
It is a substitute (-) for the GEM; however, the positive interaction between year and 
state aid implies that local effort has become less of a substitute for state aid through 
the years. 
Figure 11 confirms that local effort is a substitute for state centralization: 
counties in states with high centralization (-) have lower effort than medium state 
centralization states, while counties in states with low state centralization (+) have 
higher effort than medium state centralization states.  This relationship was expected 
since other researchers have produced the same result.  The negative interactions 
between year and both low and high state centralization indicate that counties in both 
types of states have a negative relationship with effort over time, in comparison to 
medium centralization states. 
Local effort is higher with greater need including percent poverty (+), percent 
dependent (+), percent white (-), and percent old housing (+) in 1997 and 2002, 
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Table 14: Local Effort Regression Modeling Results  
Variable Name 1987 1992 1997 2002 GEM 
Intercept -3.689*** -5.897*** -3.983*** -4.954*** -0.796 
Low State Centralization 0.257*** 0.219*** 0.192*** 0.189*** 0.262*** 
High State Centralization -0.178*** -0.206*** -0.163*** -0.263*** -0.131*** 
Federal Aid Per Capita 0.063*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.012 3E-04*** 
State Aid Per Capita -0.066*** -0.013 -0.044* 0.042* -6E-05** 
Nonmetro Nonadjacent -0.019 0.010 -0.064*** -0.058** -0.037*** 
Nonmetro Federal Land -0.077** -0.014 0.007 -0.043 -0.005 
Ln Population -0.130*** -0.113*** -0.182*** -0.181*** -0.197*** 
Percent Population Growth 0.587*** 0.317* -0.067 -0.035 -0.028 
Population Density 1E-04*** 8E-05*** 1E-04*** 1E-04*** 1E-04*** 
Population Density Squared -3E-09* -2E-09 -3E-09** -3E-09** -4E-09*** 
Ln Per Capita Income 0.246** 0.514*** 0.434*** 0.522*** 0.427*** 
Percent Urban 0.100* 0.071 0.346*** 0.385*** 0.230*** 
Percent Poverty 0.910** 1.151*** 1.287*** 1.368*** 1.015*** 
Percent Unemployment -0.095 -0.135 -0.183 -0.911* -0.093 
Percent Employment Growth -0.899*** -0.293** -0.183 0.068 -0.362*** 
Percent Out-Commuting -0.904*** -0.947*** -1.041*** -1.058*** -0.993*** 
Percent High School Graduate 1.240*** 0.761*** 0.248 0.127 0.306*** 
Percent Dependent 1.486*** 1.081*** 1.068*** 0.683** 0.275* 
Percent White -0.342*** -0.431*** -0.368*** -0.366*** -0.345*** 
Percent Old Housing 0.169 0.134 0.342*** 0.196** -0.088 
Gini Coefficient -2.169*** -2.282*** -2.584*** -2.734*** -3.011*** 
Year     0.009 
Year * Low State Centralization     -0.024* 
Year * High State Centralization     -0.021* 
Year * Federal Aid Centered     -1E-04*** 
Year * State Aid Centered     2E-05* 
Year * Percent Poverty     0.141** 
Year * Percent Employment Growth     0.068** 
N 3,059 2,876 2,990 3,014 11,939 
R Squared 0.468 0.390 0.404 0.373 0.280 
*** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05 
Values are unstandardized coefficients: natural log units for cross sectional models 
and centered units multiplied by 10 for GEM 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Sources: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000); U.S. Census of Governments 
(1987, 1992, 1997, 2002); U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service (1989, 1993, 2003)
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Figure 11: Local Effort and State Centralization Substitution Effect 1987-2002 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Source: U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002) 
Based on GEM regression results 
 
suggesting redistributive effects.  Local effort is not higher with respect to percent 
unemployment (-) in 2002 or to income inequality (-).  Theory predicts that effort will 
be higher in places with more homogeneous income distributions because all residents 
use the services paid for by tax dollars and benefit equally.  The service to benefit 
ratio, which is calculated as the value of a service to its tax cost, is primarily less than 
one for the higher income taxpayer and greater than one for the lower income 
taxpayer.  In areas with greater income inequality, wealthier residents generally prefer 
not to pay taxes for services that mainly benefit poorer residents (Schneider 1989).  
This prediction holds since local effort decreases as inequality increases.  The positive 
interaction between year and percent poverty shows that effort is more redistributive 
with respect to poverty from 1987-2002. 
Places with a larger population have lower (-) effort.  Local effort is positive 
for population density (+) and negative for population density squared (-) except in 
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Figure 12: Local Effort Density Curve 1987-2002 
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Sources: U.S. Census of Population (1990, 2000); U.S. Census of Governments (1987, 
1992, 1997, 2002) 
Based on GEM regression results 
 
1992.  Figure 12 shows that the local effort curve is upward sloping as population 
density increases except for New York City, which has the highest density in the 
sample and represents the two data points near the 25,000 persons per square mile 
density mark.  The density of New York City is slightly under 25,000 in 1990 and 
grew to just above 25,000 in 2000.  The inverted U-shape of the graph reflects the 
local response to the measure for economies of scale.  Local effort initially rises at a 
faster rate for counties with a smaller density under 5,000 persons per square mile, and 
then rises at a slower rate for counties with a higher density between 5,000 and 15,000 
persons per square mile. 
Local effort has risen with respect to percent population growth (+) in 1987 
and 1992, per capita income (+), and percent high school graduate (+) except in 1997 
and 2002, suggesting a developmental effect.  Local effort is lower (-) in counties 
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Table 15: Summary of Federal Aid Modeling Results 
REDISTRIBUTIVE DEVELOPMENTAL SPATIAL 
Poverty (+) Per Capita Income (+) Federal Land (+) 
Unemployment (+) Educational Attainment (+) Urban (-) 
Racial Minorities (+)  Out-Commuting (-)
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Sources: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000); U.S. Census of Governments 
(1987, 1992, 1997, 2002); U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service (1989, 1993, 2003) 
 
experiencing employment growth except in 1997 and 2002.  The positive interaction 
between year and percent employment growth indicates that local effort is more 
responsive as counties experience employment growth over time.  Pertaining to spatial 
effects, nonmetropolitan nonadjacent (-) counties have lower effort except in 1987 and 
1992, federal land counties (-) have lower effort in 1987, counties with a higher 
percent out-commuting (-) have lower effort, and counties with a larger percent urban 
population (+) have higher effort except in 1992.  These results are contrary to the 
descriptive statistics which suggested that nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties have 
higher effort and metropolitan counties have lower effort.  Multivariate regression is 
necessary to control for the effects of other variables. 
Discussion 
Table 15 indicates that within the context of fiscal devolution, federal aid plays 
redistributive, developmental, and spatial roles.  Federal aid is redistributive toward 
measures of need including higher poverty, unemployment, and racial minorities.  
Nonmetropolitan counties are higher in poverty and unemployment (Table 7).  
Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties have the highest poverty (Table 8).  Both 
nonmetropolitan nonadjacent and adjacent counties have the highest unemployment 
(Tables 8 and 9).  Metropolitan areas are the highest in racial minorities (Table 10).  
Federal aid is also higher for nonmetropolitan federal land counties which have a 
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limited local property tax base.  Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties have the most 
federal land counties (Table 3).  However, federal aid is not significantly different for 
nonadjacent rural counties after controlling for other variables. 
Federal aid is developmental by supporting counties with a larger per capita 
income and educational attainment.  The descriptive statistics show that metropolitan 
counties have the highest per capita income and educational attainment (Table 10).  
However, federal aid is lower for urban counties and for counties with higher out-
commuting since they can tax export and have lower service requirements.  
Metropolitan counties have the highest percent urban and out-commuting (Table 10).  
It should be noted that the dollar amount of federal aid per capita may be too small to 
accomplish any of these objectives, and that this model performed the poorest of the 
three dependent variables. 
Federal aid is highest in nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties and lowest in 
nonmetropolitan adjacent counties (Tables 3 and 4).  Although federal aid is 
insignificant for nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties and lower for urban counties, it 
is directed toward specific economic and demographic characteristics of both rural and 
urban places.  Concerning redistribution, most federal aid is targeted to attributes that 
define nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties, and then equally distributed between 
characteristics of metropolitan and nonmetropolitan adjacent counties.  In contrast, 
developmental federal aid mostly privileges traits of metropolitan counties.  Since 
federal aid neglects both rural and urban counties spatially, it is crucial that federal aid 
is directed toward both redistributive and developmental policies in order to meet the 
special needs of needs of these two types of places.  If redistributive aid declines, then 
rural places will feel the greatest burden.  Similarly, if developmental funding 
declines, then urban places will suffer the effects. 
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Table 16: Summary of State Aid Modeling Results 
REDISTRIBUTIVE DEVELOPMENTAL SPATIAL 
Per Capita Income (-) Employment Growth (+) Federal Land (+) 
Unemployment (+)  Urban (-) 
Dependents (+)  Out-Commuting (-)
Racial Minorities (+)   
Older Infrastructure (+)   
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Sources: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000); U.S. Census of Governments 
(1987, 1992, 1997, 2002); U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service (1989, 1993, 2003) 
 
The overall federal aid model effects were calculated for 1987 and 2002 by 
multiplying the unstandardized regression coefficient for each variable by its sample 
mean.  In both 1987 and 2002, the largest effect is for per capita income, although the 
sign reversed from negative (redistributive) in 1987 to positive (developmental) in 
2002.  This result demonstrates the strong trend over time toward a more pro-growth 
focus of the federal government.  The second largest effect for both 1987 and 2002 is 
state aid, which is positive in both years showing that federal aid is a complement to 
state aid.  The third largest effect in 1987 and 2002 is percent high school graduate, 
which is positive in both years.  These findings are also reflective of a developmental 
federal government that generally helps those who help themselves. 
As demonstrated by Table 16, state policy should not be viewed as a 
dichotomous choice promoting either redistribution or development; instead, a more 
nuanced approach is needed.  State aid is redistributive toward many measures of need 
including lower per capita income and higher unemployment, dependents, racial 
minorities, and older infrastructure.  The state aid directed to young and old 
dependents may consist largely of welfare payments.  The funding targeted to counties 
with older infrastructure may be infrastructure payments.  Nonmetropolitan counties 
are lower in per capita income, and higher in unemployment, dependents, and older 
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infrastructure (Table 7).  Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties have the lowest 
income, the most dependents, and the oldest infrastructure (Table 8).  Both 
nonmetropolitan nonadjacent and adjacent counties have the highest unemployment 
(Tables 8 and 9).  State aid is also higher for nonmetropolitan federal land counties 
which have a limited local property tax base.  Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties 
have the most federal land counties (Table 3).  Metropolitan areas are highest in racial 
minorities (Table 10). 
State aid is developmental in giving more support to counties with higher 
employment growth.  The descriptive statistics show that metropolitan counties have 
the highest employment growth (Table 10).  From a spatial perspective, state aid is 
lower for more urban counties and for counties with higher out-commuting, both of 
which are highest in metropolitan counties (Table 10).  State aid is not significantly 
different for nonadjacent rural counties. 
According to the descriptive statistics, state aid is highest in nonmetropolitan 
nonadjacent counties and lowest in metropolitan counties (Tables 3 and 5).  The 
regression results indicate that like federal aid, state aid is lower for urban counties 
and not significantly different for nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties.  However, it 
is directed toward specific economic and demographic characteristics found in both 
rural and urban places.  In regards to redistribution, most state aid is targeted to 
characteristics that define nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties, followed by 
metropolitan counties and nonmetropolitan adjacent counties equally.  On the other 
hand, developmental aid is aimed toward an attribute most common in metropolitan 
counties. 
Examination of Table 16 suggests that although state aid is both redistributive 
and developmental, redistribution dominates.  In both 1987 and 2002, the largest 
model effect is per capita income, which is negative for both years.  This result 
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Table 17: Summary of Local Effort Modeling Results 
REDISTRIBUTIVE DEVELOPMENTAL SPATIAL 
Poverty (+) Population Growth (+) Nonadjacent (-) 
Dependents (+) Per Capita Income (+) Federal Land (-) 
Racial Minorities (+) Educational Attainment (+) Urban (+) 
Older Infrastructure (+)  Out-Commuting (-)
U.S. County Areas excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., and Yellowstone 
National Park; N = 3,059 (1987), 2,876 (1992), 2,990 (1997), 3,014 (2002) 
Sources: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000); U.S. Census of Governments 
(1987, 1992, 1997, 2002); U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service (1989, 1993, 2003) 
 
demonstrates the strong trend over time toward a more pro-redistribution focus of state 
government.  The second largest effect for 1987 and 2002 is population, which is 
positive in both years.  This finding suggests that state aid is responsive to the benefits 
arising from economies of scale at the county level.  The third largest effect is percent 
white (-) in 1987 and percent dependent (+) in 2002.  These effects are also reflective 
of a redistributive state that gives more to those places left behind. 
State aid is redistributive with respect to percent unemployment but it is also 
developmental towards percent employment growth.  This result exemplifies the 
complementary state roles of redistribution and development.  While state aid is higher 
for counties experiencing job growth (urban areas), it is also higher in counties where 
unemployment is high (rural areas).  This finding supports other researchers who 
found that redistribution and development activities can increase together (Lobao and 
Hooks 2003; Lobao and Kraybill 2005).  In contrast to a tradeoff between 
redistribution and development, state governments can commit to different policy aims 
in different areas.  This is a benefit of state centralization: the state has the capacity to 
support both growth poles and lagging areas. 
Table 17 summarizes how the impacts of local effort are also redistributive, 
developmental, and spatial.  Local effort is redistributive toward various measures of 
need including poverty, dependents, racial minorities, and older infrastructure.  
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Nonmetropolitan counties are higher in poverty, dependents, and older infrastructure 
(Table 7).  Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties have the highest poverty, the most 
dependents, and the oldest infrastructure (Table 8).  Metropolitan areas are highest in 
racial minorities (Table 10). 
Local effort is developmental by supporting counties with higher percent 
population growth, per capita income, and educational attainment.  Metropolitan 
counties rank the highest for all of these variables (Table 10).  Local effort is lower for 
counties with higher out-commuting since they can tax export and have lower service 
requirements, which is a characteristic of metropolitan counties (Table 10).  From a 
spatial perspective, local effort is lower for nonmetropolitan nonadjacent and federal 
land counties, and higher for urban counties.  Nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties 
have the most federal land counties and metropolitan counties have the highest percent 
urban (Tables 3 and 10).  Unlike federal and state aid, local effort has a distinct spatial 
dimension for both rural and urban areas.  Local effort is most redistributive to 
attributes that define nonmetropolitan nonadjacent counties, followed by metropolitan 
counties.  Developmentally, local effort privileges characteristics of metropolitan 
counties, although local effort is the lowest for these counties. 
Similar to state aid, local effort is highest in nonmetropolitan nonadjacent 
counties and lowest in metropolitan counties (Tables 3 and 5).  In both 1987 and 2002, 
the largest model effect is per capita income, which is positive in both years.  This 
result demonstrates the pro-cyclical, developmental impact of local effort.  The second 
largest effect for both 1987 and 2002 is population, which is negative in both years.  
Local effort is responsive to economies of scale at the county level.  The third largest 
effect in 1987 and 2002 is the Gini coefficient, which is negative in both years.  This 
result is neither redistributive nor developmental, but is regressive by confirming the 
theory that effort is lower in counties with more income inequality since wealthier 
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Figure 13: Virtuous Cycle 
 
residents generally prefer not to tax themselves to provide services for poorer residents 
(Schneider 1989).  These effects show that overall, local effort is a mixed bag of 
development, economies of scale, and regressivity.  Although redistributive variables 
are significant as well, they are swamped by these larger effects. 
Warner (1997) discovered that federal aid, state aid, and local effort can lead to 
virtuous and vicious cycles among local governments.  This finding has been 
confirmed by later analyses (Warner and Pratt 2005; Warner 2006, 2003, 1999).  
Figure 13 shows the virtuous cycle found in wealthier jurisdictions that have a larger 
tax base with tax rates that are either the same or lower than poorer jurisdictions.  
These places will have lower costs and invest more, leading to stronger economic 
development, yielding more government revenue to invest in further development.  As 
a result, these wealthier localities will be preferred by businesses and households, 
enlarging the tax base and increasing the wealth gap between regions. 
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Figure 14: Vicious Cycle 
 
Figure 14 illustrates the vicious cycle found in poorer jurisdictions that have a 
smaller tax base with tax rates that are either the same or higher than wealthier 
jurisdictions.  These places will have higher costs and invest less, leading to weaker 
economic development, yielding limited government revenue to invest in further 
development.  Under decentralization, the places most likely to be caught in these 
vicious cycles are high-poverty rural and inner-city areas.  It is this vicious cycle that 
increases effort in poor nonmetropolitan counties.  Local government is caught in 
these virtuous and vicious cycles, and the federal government is amplifying this effect 
with its pro-cyclical, developmental focus.  Since state aid is more redistributive, it 
can help to break the vicious cycle.  Although local effort has some redistributive 
attributes and is countercyclical, the regression results suggest that the developmental 
effects dominate. 
Federal aid, state aid, and local effort are lower for counties with higher out-
commuting; and federal and state aid are lower for more urban counties due to their 
ability to tax export.  Metropolitan counties have the highest percent urban and out-
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commuting (Table 10).  Urban areas can export part of their tax burden to people 
living outside the county by shifting taxes to nonresident commuters, shoppers, and 
tourists (Chernick and Reschovsky 1995; Ladd and Bradbury 1988; Warner and Pratt 
2005; Yinger and Ladd 1989; Yinger 1990).  Tax exporting enhances fiscal capacity 
because it allows a portion of the cost of public services to be paid for by nonresidents 
(Chernick and Reschovsky 1995; Chernick 1998).  By giving less aid to these 
counties, the federal and state government recognize that they benefit from tax 
exporting. 
Theoretical and Policy Implications 
Federal aid is found to be both redistributive and developmental, with a 
stronger emphasis on pro-cyclical development.  However, its per capita dollar amount 
is too small to be significant.  Increasing federal aid to county governments would be a 
good start to fully realize the redistributive and developmental potential of federal aid.  
With its large tax base and lack of balanced budget requirements, the federal 
government is capable of increasing aid to county governments. 
Due to declining revenue from federal government, the state is now 
responsible for more redistributive and developmental functions, although its focus is 
more on redistribution.  Since state government is a high enough level for 
redistribution and a low enough level for development, the state is up to this task.  
This study has shown the emergence of the meso level state and its important roles for 
both redistribution and development.  However, state policy differences concerning 
state aid and centralization create a very uneven landscape for local government well-
being.  While states can address spatial inequality within their own borders by 
increasing aid or fiscal centralization, they cannot reduce interstate inequality in local 
government revenue.  This factor also suggests that a stronger role is needed for the 
federal government to supplement the efforts of states to address spatial inequality 
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across the nation as a whole.  Because federal and state aid are complements and more 
so over time, any increase in federal aid should recognize this and be careful to assess 
whether it is complementing the redistributive or developmental aspects of state aid.  
The choice will depend on the policy goal. 
Finally, local government revenue effort follows federal and state aid by taking 
on both redistributive and developmental roles, with a greater emphasis on 
development.  Nonetheless, the county level may be too low of a level of government 
to successfully implement both types of policies effectively, especially in counties 
with lower tax bases.  Government poor counties facing a smaller revenue base and 
demographic disadvantages are not capable of promoting effective redistribution or 
development. 
The results suggest that fiscal devolution has impacted functions of the federal 
and local government such that there is far more overlap between the traditional roles 
prescribed by fiscal federalism.  In a policy context that has seen a decline in federal 
funding to localities, the federal government no longer solely handles redistribution 
and local government does not focus only on development.  The complexities of 
today’s policy climate require that the micro, meso, and macro levels of government 
each fulfill functions of redistribution and development to the best of their resources 
and capabilities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Policy Recommendations 
This study recommends an increase in redistributive federal aid to local 
government since only the central government is capable of ameliorating inequality in 
local revenue capacity across the entire nation.  In its current form, federal aid per 
capita is too small to be effective.  Compared to state aid, federal aid is more pro-
cyclical and developmental.  As a result, federal aid can exacerbate inequality among 
local governments that are prospering and those that are lagging.  However, given the 
greater revenue tax base and revenue flexibility of the federal government, it has the 
potential to become redistributive and countercyclical, especially now during a time of 
recession. 
In comparison to federal aid, state aid is more redistributive.  While some 
redistributive functions have been devolved to the state level, these functions should 
not be decentralized further to the local level.  States are equipped with state aid and 
state centralization to mitigate the negative impacts of fiscal devolution.  To better 
address both redistribution and development, the states must continue the trends 
illustrated by the data of increasing state aid and state centralization.  Local 
governments can only pursue redistribution and development to the extent that their 
tax base will allow.  At the local level, counties with higher income inequality spend 
less on services benefiting the poor.  Therefore, federal and state aid to county 
governments must be more redistributive since local effort will not be in places with 
the highest income inequality. 
Local government is caught in virtuous and vicious cycles which the federal 
government is amplifying with its pro-cyclical, developmental focus.  The strongest 
effect for all three of the dependent variables is per capita income.  At both the federal 
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and local level, the result is pro-cyclical and developmental.  Federal aid is higher for 
counties with higher incomes and local governments with higher incomes have higher 
effort.  At the state level, the strongest effect is redistributive in that counties with 
higher incomes receive less state aid.  Because both federal aid and local effort are 
predominately developmental, the state role in redistribution has become even more 
important.  Since state aid is more redistributive than developmental, it can help to 
break the vicious cycle reinforced by federal aid and local effort. 
The result that local effort is redistributive and countercyclical with respect to 
poverty and more so over time is theoretically unexpected since the theory of fiscal 
federalism proposes that local governments are incapable of redistribution.  By 
spending more on poverty, county governments can escape the vicious cycle.  
However, to do this, they need more aid from both the federal and state government to 
better achieve the functions of redistribution and development which are so critical to 
their residents’ well-being and quality of life.  The analysis also highlights the need for 
both federal and state aid to explicitly target both rural and urban areas to help with 
their higher service costs.  In particular, the data has shown that nonmetropolitan 
nonadjacent counties are often the most disadvantaged on demographic measures of 
need. 
Challenges for Future Policy 
The challenge for future government finance policy at all levels is first to 
generate the revenue needed for the promotion of both redistribution and development, 
and secondly to generate the political will to apply this funding toward implementing 
policies that fulfill both of these important functions.  Given that the United States is 
currently facing its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s, the 
danger is that not enough revenue will be available at all government levels to fully 
support both redistribution and development.  Furthermore, the focus of government 
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finance policy may shift more strongly toward generating economic development, 
possibly at the expense of redistribution since funds are so low. 
After the Great Depression, the federal government took on greater 
responsibility for both economic and social welfare.  For example, the government 
became more involved in economic planning, regulation, and the provision of a 
stronger social safety-net.  In the present context, it remains to be seen whether the 
national government will assume a bigger role in both development and redistribution.  
In response to the economic crisis, the banks, businesses, and citizens affected are 
turning to the central government for solutions and assistance.  The government has 
continued its pro-cyclical trend by distributing billions of dollars in developmental aid 
to banks, lending agencies, and the automobile industry.  However, no redistributive 
funding has been provided to employees who lost their jobs or to homeowners who 
lost their homes. 
Meanwhile, the states face balanced-budget requirements and will also be 
focused on strengthening their economies during a recession, at the expense of 
redistribution.  Finally, local governments, who are facing economic decline, lower tax 
bases, and higher unemployment, will be forced to reduce spending in this context.  
This pro-cyclical effect will exacerbate the negative impacts of the economic 
downturn at the local level. 
Questions for Future Research 
Future research could follow up on the fiscal devolution trends during the 
economic crisis, especially when the 2007 and 2012 U.S. Census of Governments data 
and the 2010 U.S. Census of Population data become available.  It will be interesting 
to see how the policies of President Barack Obama confront the financial challenges 
facing governments at all levels.  In addition, an analysis using spatial modeling or 
neural network modeling could further explore the impacts of decentralization in 
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urban and rural areas.  A study of the redistributive and developmental impacts of 
specific programs such as education and health care would also be useful to the policy 
community. 
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